

Intergenerational transmission of political affiliation

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Abstract

We investigate the intergenerational correlation of political affiliation by using register data from Sweden including all nominated politicians for the years 1982 to 2014. First, we demonstrate that there is a strong link between individuals and their parents concerning choice of political affiliation on the bloc level. We also find that the intergenerational correlation is not only present between parents and children, but also existent over the generations and across siblings. Our second aim is to investigate the mechanisms behind this result, which we do by first discussing two hypotheses: A sociological explanation and a materialistic explanation grounded in the rational choice approach to politics. We then bring these hypotheses to the data and find that the sociological explanation seems matter more for explaining the intergenerational correlation.

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1 Introduction

Individuals are unquestionably affected by the context in which they grow up, where the family is expected to play a central role. A person's political participation and political engagement is for instance likely to increase if he or she has a parent that has been nominated to political office. The impact is likely to be twofold; a person whose father or mother is a politician for a specific political party is probably both more likely to be overall more politically active, but also specifically more inclined to sympathize with the political party in question. Although parents are likely to be important characters, they do not act as the solitary source of influence. There is a dynamic process taking place during a person's childhood where one is also affected by the opinions, beliefs and demands of other people in close proximity, such as the extended family.

In political science, one often occurring argument is that democratic deliberation is important in order to reach an enlightened societal decision. The argument in itself should be evaluated and not the messenger of the argument according to the proponents of deliberation.¹ A strong intergenerational transmission of political beliefs between parents and their children could thus be seen as problematic, given that it could be interpreted as individuals are not master of their own beliefs but instead (deterministically) formed by earlier generations. From a point of view that encourage deliberation, this could be seen as an obstacle if we believe that party choice should not be path-dependent but instead based on an individual assessment of the political arguments. Although an intergenerational transmission of political beliefs indicates that individuals depend on their parents when making political choices, it does not necessarily mean that they are mindless. One explanation for why children and parents may hold similar political views is because of an intergenerational link with regards to materialistic factors (income, employment status and wealth) meaning that they also have similar political demands. A society where political beliefs are strongly influenced by materialistic inheritance over the generations is however also problematic if the ideal is that each person's should individually be the principal determinate of his or her success and political conviction.

There is a large and growing literature in political science, sociology and economics studying intergenerational transmissions and this paper continues in this tradition. Our main purpose is to investigate intergenerational correlations of political affiliation within the family by using Swedish register data. Political affiliation is going to be defined as being nominated for a political bloc. How strong is the intergenerational correlation of political affiliation? We will investigate this both in

¹As Huddy et al. (2013) point out, deliberation is also a form of information dissemination. Full information in turn is an important underpinning in the rational choice approach to politics. People need to have information in order to maximize their utility.

the context of the immediate family, but we also investigate the intergenerational correlation taking the extended family into account which all together provides us with a more complete picture of the intergenerational dependence. The next question is then how one may explain intergenerational transmission of political affiliation. Which mechanisms are in play? We are going to highlight two main theoretical mechanisms that we have chosen to denote as the sociological pathway and the materialistic pathway. The notion that an individual is socialized into political beliefs emphasizes discussions at home as the main transmission mechanism. The materialistic view on the other hand is more connected to a rational choice and political economics approach to politics where individuals are utility maximizers where their demands depend on their material standard (that could be intergenerationally transmitted). We are going to discuss these theoretical predictions one at the turn and then bring the predictions to the data.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section reviews the earlier, mostly empirical, literature with an emphasis on papers that have studied intergenerational transmission of political beliefs. We then present the theoretical framework in which we discuss the sociological explanation for intergenerational transmission and the materialistic perspective where income is the driving mechanism in the latter. Next follows a presentation of the data material. We then continue with the institutional setting and the empirical model. Follow suit are the benchmark results for the intergenerational correlation and the robustness checks for these results. We then finish by focusing on the mechanisms that we discussed in the theoretical framework. The paper ends with a discussion and a conclusion.

1.1 Earlier literature

The literature analyzing how political beliefs and political affiliations are transmitted is vast and almost exclusively empirical. The literature review in this section will therefore focus on the empirical findings and we return to the underlying theoretical arguments in section 2. The main focus of this earlier empirical literature has, at least indirectly, been on the socialization aspect within the family. In recent years, political scientists have also analyzed whether genetic factors play a role and found support for this (Alford et al., 2005, Oskarsson et al., 2014, Hatemi et al., 2014, Cesarini et al., 2014, Oskarsson et al., 2017). The genetic pathway may be discussed in light of a materialistic explanation where genetics provides the foundation for income formation of the life-cycle, an argument we return to in the theoretical section below.

Jennings (2007) reviews the empirical literature in his chapter in the Oxford handbook of political behavior. Jennings and Niemi (1968) was one of the first papers that investigated this intergenerational transmission using American survey data from a sample consisting of high school students and their parents where

the authors found mixed results with regards to different political values. Party preferences seems however to be transmitted from parents to child. Jennings et al. (2009) expanded on this analysis by including several cohorts. An important conclusion is that the transmission of opinions for a given topic is dependent on other context at the time of the survey. The authors also find that the transmission is larger in families with strong political commitment. Tedin (1974) points out that parents' salience over an issue is dependent on the intergenerational transmission of their beliefs to their children, but also how accurately the child perceives the attitudes of his or her parents. Beck and Jennings (1975) apply an analysis with three generations. They use a survey data set consisting of high school students which was complemented with interviews concerning parents' and grandparents' stated political affiliation. One interesting conclusion is that fathers' political affiliation seemed to be the dominating source of political socialization in the parent-grandparent generation but that in the child-parent generation, both parent had almost an equal impact on the political affiliation of their children when parents disagree. Beck and Jennings (1991) focus instead on how parental transmission of political beliefs has changed over time in a three-wave survey and find that the intergenerational transmission became lower at times of the general antiauthoritativens movements during the 1960's and 1970's and that children originating from highly Republican or highly Democratic families were mostly affected by the general trends against authoritativens.

Later studies have emphasized the importance of the institutional setting when studying intergenerational transmission. Percheron and Jennings (1981) point out that France is divided by a right and a left dimension instead of a party dimension in comparison to the United States. The authors perform their analysis with cross-country survey data which support their view that the intergenerational transmission either take place as a party affiliation or as a left-right dimension but not explicitly as a party identification transmission. Westerholm and Niemi (1992) revisit these results by also adding Sweden and Finland to the dataset and argue that the conclusion of an inverse relationship between a right-left transmission and political party identification does not apply to these Nordic countries. Ventura (2001) shows by making use of data from Israel that the intergenerational correlation between parents and their children is higher when considering political blocs instead of political parties separately.

These earlier papers study citizens that are normally not politicians by using survey data with a battery of questions concerning political attitudes, meaning that that authors focus on *stated party preferences*. The focus in our paper is instead to focus on *revealed party preferences* since we have access to register data regarding nominated politicians. There are pros and cons connected to both approaches. Our approach has the advantage of using a more objective measure

of political affiliation. Being nominated or elected for a party is a clearer signal of political conviction than stating in a survey that you prefer a specific party. We also have the advantage of using population wide data for all politicians in Sweden for a given time period. We may not however focus on a more fine-grained analysis with regards to political preferences but instead settle on using political party affiliation as a catch-all measure. The main disadvantage of using surveys is that people may not necessarily state their true preferences in surveys and that this problem becomes more severe when parents are answering the same survey. There is *self-selection* into generational surveys where the eagerness to answer may be correlated with political beliefs, (Connell, 1972). We do however also have a selection problem in this paper concerning who is becoming a politician and we return to this issue in section 2.

Other than the political socialization literature, our paper is also related to the literature on political dynasties and family connections. Dal Bó et al. (2009) demonstrated that children of U.S. congressmen tend to run and be elected to the same congressional seat as their parents and that this intergenerational effect is strong in comparison to other professions. Cruz et al. (2017) concluded by using data from the Philippines that family networks and especially centrality within these networks are important explanatory factors for vote share for a candidate. Our focus is however on partisan affiliation rather than on how political offices are *inherited* within families and how family connections influence vote shares.

There are papers that have used similar Swedish data as we do to study other related questions which is connected to our paper since we are in part interested in the materialistic explanation for intergenerational transmission of political affiliation. These papers have primarily focused on human capital and wealth. Grönqvist et al. (2016) demonstrated a strong link between parents' cognitive and non-cognitive ability and their children. Adermon et al. (2016) estimate the transmission of human capital over the generations and across the extended family (a dynasty) whereas Adermon et al. (2018) studies the intergenerational transmission of wealth over the generations. The conclusions from both these papers are that there seems to be large intergenerational correlations across the generations both with regards to human capital and wealth. These papers also highlight the importance of not just studying two generations, but instead extend the analysis to multiple generations in order to capture the overall intergenerational transmission effect. This is also discussed in Lindahl et al. (2014) and Lindahl et al. (2015) who study human capital.²

²See also Josephson et al. (2013) who demonstrate a positive intergenerational correlation with regards to sick leave between parents and their children.

2 Theoretical framework

The overall aim with this section is to discuss the potential theoretical pathways through which transmission of political affiliation go.

We are going to focus on two theoretical pathways: 1) The socialization pathway and 2) the materialistic pathway. We discuss the theoretical underpinning of these two pathways each in turn. Given that these two hypotheses originates from two different theoretical traditions, they are presented in a quite different manner. The presentation of the sociological pathway is going to be verbal whereas the materialistic pathway is going to take a more formal rational choice approach. In the last part when we discuss the materialistic pathway, we also discuss selection issues because these may be highlighted in a pedagogical way within the rational choice framework that we present.

2.1 The socialization pathway

Beginning with the socialization pathway, this was indirectly the starting point in many of the earlier empirical papers that we previously discussed in section 1.1. The core idea is that discussions at home with parents and relatives function as a socialization treatment. If a parent is a convinced liberal, it is more likely that the child is also more liberal simply because children spend so much time together with their parents and parents act as role models. As we indicated in the literature review, most papers that have studied intergenerational transmission of political affiliations are empirical and the exact theoretical foundation in these papers is rather weak. The *theory* is mostly concerned with when the transmission is taking place without being explicit about the sociological underpinning of the theoretical idea. As [Sears and Brown \(2013\)](#) highlight: Time, or rather timing, is of the essence. Does the (socialization) process starts already at birth, or is an individual particularly susceptible during another time in life?

A central idea within the socialization pathway has been that political views are crystalized as a person ages, meaning that views and perception is likely more susceptible at a younger age ([Campbell et al., 1980](#)). Given that a person spend most of the time together with his or her parents at a young age, it is natural to assume that parents plays an important role for political socialization ([McIntosh et al., 2007](#)). It has also been demonstrated by [Fox and Lawless \(2005\)](#) that people growing up in a politicized environment possesses a higher nascent political ambition and thus a higher propensity to run for office as an adult.³

³The gender gap with regards to political ambition has been demonstrated to be substantial where women for example experience less encouragement from parents ([Fox and Lawless, 2014](#)). This might be a result of the fact that women are underrepresented in elected office world wide.

A similar, yet distinct, socialization explanation is that an individual is particularly influenced by parents and peers during *the impressionable years* and not at a young age. The exact definition of when the impressionable years start and end is debated, but late adolescence and early adulthood is usually considered when discussing this period in life. According to this hypothesis, a person is for the first time placed in a socialization context where politics is an important part at the same time as the individual is defining him or herself as an independent individual. The argument is that the political views formed during this period have a persistent effect on adult political beliefs (Manheim, 1952, Sears, 1975, Sears and Brown, 2013).

In brief, it seems like there are somewhat conflicting views on when a person is mostly influenced although both explanations highlight political socialization. The two views are thus connected and may be interpreted in light of parental influence. Clearly parents are important for the crystallization hypothesis, but even the impressionable year hypothesis is indirectly based on parental selection. A child that grows up in a particular neighborhood will go to school with a subset of children whose parents are likely to be similar to his or her own parents. It is also likely that political discussions initiated at home continue with peers. Socialization thus reinforces itself through different pathways where parents play an important role (Andolina et al., 2003). When an individual reaches the impressionable years, he or she is put in a context together with peers based on predisposed characteristics of the parents. It is likely that this context provides similar views as that of the parents during childhood.

To summarize this discussion, the socialization pathways emphasize the parents' political beliefs. These beliefs are either directly transmitted or indirectly due to sorting into socialization contexts during the impressionable years. The focus in our paper is however not to distinguish between the crystallization hypothesis and the impressionable years hypothesis, but instead contrast this with the materialistic pathway that we discuss in the next subsection. Before we continue, it is worth highlighting some implications of the socialization pathway. Given that parents' active presence is of the essence in this pathway, the absence of a parent – for example because of death or divorce – would then yield a lower parental transmission of political affiliation. In order for the socialization pathway to work, children need to spend time with their parents. Also the impressionable years hypothesis rests indirectly on this necessity. If the child lives only with one parent, it is likely that sorting into neighborhoods and schools is going to be based on the characteristics of this parent and not primarily the other parents that the child does not live with. We summarize the discussion on this subsection in one empirical testable prediction in statement 1:

Statement 1: The intergenerational transmission of political affiliation is less pronounced when a child did not live with the politically nominated parent during childhood.

2.2 The materialistic pathway

In contrast to the socialization view stands the materialistic pathway. This theoretical explanation emphasize that political demands are driven by economic conditions and the reason why parent and their children have similar political demands is because they share a similar materialistic standard. Note that *preferences* are considered fixed in standard neo-classical theory and that only *demand* changes when other factor changes. This is thus somewhat in contrast to sociological starting point, although the difference is somewhat semantic.⁴ In this subsection we therefore sketch a theoretical rational choice framework of how we may think of the intergenerational link between parents and their children with regards to political demands. This section also contains a discussion on the selection issues we face in the empirical analysis. Sequentially, we are going to highlight some empirically testable predictions just as we did in the last subsection. We do not create a theoretical model where we solve for equilibria and our theoretical reasoning is mostly modifications of earlier theoretical work. In particular, the simple theoretical framework follows chapter 1, 2 and 5 in Persson and Tabellini (2000) but is extended to take into account intergenerational aspects.

Let us begin by assuming the existence of a continuum of voters, $C = 1, 2, \dots, N$ where voters are intergenerationally linked in a hierarchical manner, such that all voters are both a parent, p , and a child, c , i.e. $\forall v \in C = \{p \wedge c\}$. For simplicity, assume that all children have parents and that all parents have children. Further assume that all voters, $v \in C$, have identical utility functions regardless of being a parent or a child and that they derive utility from two types of goods: private good consumption, y_i , and public good consumption, G , according to the following quasi-linear utility function:

$$U_i = y_i + f(G) \tag{1}$$

Each individual, i , also faces a private budget constraint:

$$y_i = (1 - \tau)w_i \tag{2}$$

⁴Standard neo-classic theory considers preferences changes as residual explanation, given that one could explain almost almost every change in behavior due to a change in preferences.

w_i is private income and τ is a proportional income tax. Hence, w_i differs for each individual where w_i is distributed according to the cumulative distribution function $F(\bullet)$, so that $E[w_i] = \bar{w}$. The government finance public good provision solely on tax revenues where the public budget may be written as :

$$G = \tau \bar{w} \quad (3)$$

The optimal level of public goods for individual, i , is found by first inserting the budget constraints into (1) and then take the first order condition:

$$\begin{aligned} U_i &= \left(1 - \frac{G}{\bar{w}}\right) w_i + f(G) \\ U_i &= (\bar{w} - G) \frac{w_i}{\bar{w}} + f(G) \\ \frac{\partial U_i}{\partial G} &= -\frac{w_i}{\bar{w}} + f'(G) = 0 \end{aligned}$$

We then solve for optimal G :

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{w_i}{\bar{w}} &= f'(G) \\ G^* &= f_g^{-1} \frac{w_i}{\bar{w}} \end{aligned}$$

f_g^{-1} is the inverse of the function $f(\bullet)$ of the first partial derivative with respect to G . This means that G^* is monotonically increasing in w_i . Also note that voters have single peaked preferences.

Statement 2: An individual, i , demands a higher degree of public good provision (and a higher tax rate) if having a lower relative income and vice versa.

Let us now focus on the link between parents and their children. A child's income level is assumed to depend on predisposed characteristics inherited from the parent, g_i^p , and an exogenous variable ε_i^c which is individual specific. The realizations of g_i^p and ε_i^c are independent events.

$$w_i^c = q(g_i^p) + \varepsilon_i^c$$

g_i^p is best interpreted as all predisposed factors that is positive for future income, such that $q'(g_i^p) > 0$ and $q''(g_i^p) < 0$. This may for instance be genetic factors. Connecting to the recent empirical literature on genetics in political science, the wage level would according to the setting in this rational choice model be a proxy of redistributive demands that in turn could have a genetic explanation. Given the assumption that each parent has a child and that all children have parents, the parental wage level thus depends on predisposed characteristics from the grandparents. In essence, the wage level of the child, will depend on the wage level of the parent, but also the grandparents. The variable ε_i is best interpreted as a random shock not attributed to any parental factors. An increase in any predisposed factors will thus lead to a higher income level of the child. The total intergenerational connection in income between parents and their offsprings is determined by the size of ε_i .⁵

Statement 3: A child's demand of public good provision will depend on the income level of the parents.

We have now concluded that parents' and childrens' demand for public good provision is connected. A high income parent is more likely to foster a high income child and both of them will demand less public good provision. In a model where political candidates are exogenous from the voters, the voters must map his or her demands to the policy platforms of the politicians. For the sake of keeping the theoretical framework simple, let us assume that there is no agency problem and that the degree of rents equals 0.

Statement 4: An individual with relatively high income prefers a political candidate whose policy platform consists of relatively lower spending on public goods and lower taxes and vice versa.⁶

The focus of this paper is on political candidacy, meaning that we need to discuss the decision to run for office. This discussion follows the citizen-candidate model

⁵The variable ε_i may be interpreted as various compensatory measures, such as mandatory education.

⁶The attentive reader would here point out that it is never rational to vote given that the probability of being the decisive voter is extremely small (e.g. the voting paradox). Later researchers have however tried to overcome this problem by incorporating expressive utility into the voting participation choice, see Hillman (2010). Statement 4 would be in line with an explanation where individuals *expressively* vote in accordance with their self-interest. Continuing this line of reasoning, politicians have incentives to cater to the policy preference of the median voter (e.g. the Hotelling-Downs model), see Hotelling (1929) and Downs (1957).

framework developed in Besley and Coate (1997) and Osborne and Slivinski (1996) in which politicians originates from the electorate. Voters and politicians are in this case not two different kind of humans; instead they have similar utility functions.

Let us assume a three stage game. First, individuals decide whether to become candidates or not. Second, the voters decide and vote (strategically) in an election. Third, the winning candidate implement policy.

The citizen-candidate model has multiple equilibria and many different features which we will not discuss here. Just consider the first stage of the game. Let $W_i(G)$ denote the indirect utility for individual i for a given amount of public good provision. Further assume in line with the citizen-candidate model that there is a cost associated with running for office, which we denote as γ_i . Individual i , will then become a candidate in the first round of the game if

$$W_i^{c,p}(G^*) - W_i^{c,p}(\bar{G}) \geq \gamma_i$$

\bar{G} is the default policy that is implemented if no one is running for office. This tells us that only a subset of all individuals are going to run for office. Connecting this to our earlier discussion, we reach the following statement:

Statement 5: If both the parent and the child find it beneficial to run for office, $W_i^{c,p}(G^*) - W_i^{c,p}(\bar{G}) \geq \gamma_i$, their chosen policy in the last stage of the game will be relatively more similar in comparison to two randomly picked candidates.

We now have four different statements which all have the possibility to be empirically testable. We may not however test all these statements for all individuals due to data limitations. Statement 2 and 3 concerns demands for public good provision. To test these statements for the entire electorate, we need some type of survey data which we do not have in our possession. Statement 4 concerns voting. In democracies, the decision who you vote for is not public information meaning that we cannot test this statement either. We may however test statement 5 since we may observe political candidacy. For the subset of candidates that we do observe in the data, we do also have the possibility of indirectly address statement 1–3 by making use of political candidacy as a proxy variable.

What is important to remember is that we only observe the the outcome after the first stage of the citizen-candidate model where individuals have already decided to run for office. We are hence focusing our entire analysis on those where the cost of running, γ , was low enough. According to the theoretical reasoning above, those individuals running for office do so because they want to have their preferred policy implemented. This means that they act according to their utility function and that their choice of policy platform represent their demands for taxes

and public goods. Political candidacy serves as a good proxy of true political beliefs in this case.

Assumption: Political parties may be ranked on a ordinal scale from left to right where left-wing parties favor higher taxes and higher public good spending. Right-wing parties favor lower taxes and lower public good spending.

This assumption is uncontroversial, but important for our purpose. Although we may not observe the demands for each individual, we do observe the political affiliation in the data. In this simple framework, the political affiliation is an informative proxy for the underlying demand for redistribution, which in turn is determined by differences in income levels.

The problem is that the cost of voting may be a function of the distance between the child's preferred policy platform and the parent's preferred policy platform. Within the theoretical framework we have discussed here, this would equal to a difference in income which is a result of ε_i^c . In essence, we have self-selection into political candidacy where a child may decide not to run in order not to anger his or her parents (i.e. a high cost of political candidacy). Our empirical analysis will hence be constrained by the fact that we may only use political candidacy as a proxy for political demands for those who we ex-post observe as candidates.

2.3 Concluding theoretical remarks

We have discussed two different pathways through which parents may transmit political beliefs. The first pathway runs through discussions at home where political opinion and beliefs are transmitted on an interpersonal level. The second pathway disregards this *at home* discussion and instead emphasize that the income level is transmitted intergenerationally and that this affect political demands. In a nutshell, the socialization pathway depends on spending time with parents, whereas the materialistic pathway hinges on a connection between income and political demands. In the upcoming empirical analysis we will try to distinguish between these two pathways by bringing them to the data.

3 Data and choice of variables

The data material originates from Swedish official registers. What is unique with our data is that it contains almost the entire population meaning that we may study all politicians from the national, county and municipal level. The data set begin in 1982 which is the starting year in our study and 2014 is the last year.

Being a politician is relatively rare and it is even rarer that both a child and the parent(s) are politician. We will therefore focus on all nominated politicians in our analysis in order to increase the sample size. It is also a fact that nominated politicians in Sweden often end up in elected positions during the mandate period because other elected politicians resign. Focusing on nominated politicians is also natural if we are interested in political affiliation and not the intergenerational transmission of elective office. We thus add politicians from all three national elections in Sweden together.

As we discussed in the theoretical framework section, we have an obstacle in how to interpret our results given that we only observe political affiliations for those you are candidates. Having a certain political party affiliation by becoming nominated by a political party could of course be interpreted as simply that and nothing more: *Being affiliated with a specific party*. But it is not far-fetched to also interpret it is as having a certain set of political preferences and demands (an explanation in line with the citizen-candidate model). Does a person simply become nominated for career reasons or do they truly believe in the party's political platform? The problem is that we cannot disentangle this difference. Equivalently, we cannot say whether a person that is not nominated have different political preferences and demands vis à vis their parents. In order not to overstate the interpretations of our results, we will refer to the intergenerational correlation of political *affiliation*, but still acknowledge that it has the potential of having a deeper interpretation of political candidacy.

In addition to the data set on nominated politicians we also have access to a multigenerational data set which enables us to link children to their parents but also link individuals to their siblings and grandparents. This is crucial given the purpose of the paper. We also have information on gender, meaning that we can look at heterogeneous effects for males and females respectively.

To test the socialization pathway, we need to know whether individuals grew up with their politically nominated parents. By employing data where individuals have resided each year starting from birth on the SAMS-level, we create a mode SAMS-area for all individuals and all parents. We then define a variable for not living with parents if the mode for the individuals is different from the mode of the parents between birth and age 18.

For the materialistic pathway, we need income data, which we obtain from the LISA-register. We standardize income for each cohort for the first year after the age 33. Earlier literature has highlighted that it is problematic to use current income as a proxy for life-income (Engström and Hagen, 2015, Böhlmark and Lindquist, 2005). After 30, most individuals that have enrolled in higher education has established themselves on the labor market.

4 Institutional setting

Elections in Sweden took place every third year prior of 1994 and every fourth year after that. Elections are held for seats at the municipal councils, the county councils and the parliament on a single election day. Sweden has a PR-system with closed lists where the position on a party list is important with regards to the possibility of being elected. Those who are on a list, but do not receive a seat on for instance on the municipal council often serve on various political posts that are not directly elected by the electorate, such as on various municipal committees. It is neither uncommon that a nominated politician that is not elected receives a seat during the mandate period if the office holder resigns.

The Swedish political parties may be divided into two different blocs: the center-right (called the bourgeois parties in Sweden) and the center-left (called the red-greens). The center-right bloc consists of the Moderate Party (conservatives), the Christian Democrats, the Liberal Party and the Center Party. The center-left includes the Green Party, the Social Democrats and the Left Party. In addition, there is the Sweden Democrats which is a right-wing populist party that is not normally considered part of any of the two blocs. The Sweden Democrats was a very small political party for a very long time and they entered parliament in 2010, but has gained strength in recent years. Each party has different nominated traditions. In some parties, primary election takes place to fix the position on a party list in an election. In other parties, the local party board decides on the final list. Some political parties use a combination of primary elections and board decision.

Given that the Swedish political arena is clearly divided between a center-right and a center-left bloc, we will use variables for these two blocs as the main dependent variables. There is also one additional reason for focusing on the blocs that is more concerned with selection and how to interpret the intergenerational correlation in question. The Swedish political system has a clear right-left dimension and by focusing on the political blocs we are closer to an interpretation of intergenerational transmission of political beliefs, although we are estimating the correlation of political bloc affiliation. We do however run an analysis for each political party separately and present the results in the appendix.

5 Empirical framework

The empirical framework for studying intergenerational transmissions is very simple where we run Markovian regressions. We are only interested in correlations and none of the estimated coefficients have any causal interpretation. We add all types of politicians (parliamentarians, county politicians and municipal politicians) to-

gether and create binary indicator variables for whether a mother or a father was a nominated politician and from this we create variables for whether at parent was a nominated politician. If an individual or a parent has been nominated for multiple parties over the time period, we use the most frequent political party affiliation for the years that we observe. Based on this information, we create bloc variables for the center-right and the center-left respectively. We estimate the following regression equation in the main analysis:

$$Y_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 X_p^i + \beta_3 W_i + u_i$$

Y_i is a binary indicator variable for whether individual i was nominated for the center-right/center-left and 0 otherwise. X_p^i takes the value 1 if the parent, p , of individual i was a nominated politician for the center-right/center-left and 0 otherwise. All regressions will thus be separated for the center-right and the center-left respectively. β_0 is the intercept and u_i is the error term. W_i is a vector of interactions with income and indicator variables for whether the individual lived with his or her parents during childhood which we apply when addressing the underlying mechanisms.

It might be that the probability of being nominated to political office differ between different municipalities in Sweden. It might also be that the probability has increased or decreased over the election years. To take this into account, we add municipal fixed effects and election year fixed effects (defined as the year when the individual was first nominated to office) in some specifications. In all regressions we restrict the sample to individuals with at least one positive outcome in the family variables (in most tables that translates to at least one parent who has been nominated for any party).

6 Results

In this section we will present the results. Each table will be divided into the center-right and the center-left where the correlation is estimated for each bloc separately. We begin by investigating the benchmark intergenerational correlation between parents and their children with regards to political affiliation in several specifications. We then continue to the mechanisms behind these results and focus on the socialization pathway and the materialistic pathway.

Table 1: Benchmark intergenerational correlations. Individuals and their parents

	(1) Center-right	(2) Center-right	(3) Center-left	(4) Center-left
Center-right Parents	0.759*** (0.004)	0.739*** (0.004)		
Center-left Parents			0.750*** (0.004)	0.743*** (0.004)
Constant	0.107*** (0.003)	0.106*** (0.035)	0.095*** (0.003)	0.147*** (0.034)
Mean dep.var.	0.554	0.554	0.351	0.351
Muni. FE nom.	No	Yes	No	Yes
Election year FE	No	Yes	No	Yes
R2	0.565	0.580	0.556	0.565
Observations	23957	23917	23957	23917

Standard errors in parenthesis. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

6.1 Benchmark results: What is the intergenerational correlation of political affiliation?

We will start as simple as possible where Table 1 is our main benchmark table. Here we estimate the intergenerational correlation for each bloc separately for all individuals and their parents in our data set. Looking at Table 1, it is clear that the intergenerational correlation between parents and child is very strong for both center-left politicians and center-right politicians. Interestingly, the coefficients are almost identical for center-right and center-left politicians. The results for the fixed-effects estimations where we add municipal fixed effects and election year fixed effects are presented column 2 and 4 in Table 1. We may conclude that the intergenerational correlation is not affected by inclusion of these fixed effects and we therefore do not add them in subsequent specifications.

We have now concluded that there is a strong intergenerational correlation between parents and their children. For most individuals however, there are two persons considered to be their parents. We therefore further investigate whether they are mostly influenced by their mother or father respectively. The results are presented in Table 2 where we also divide the sample between female and males. The sample is restricted to individuals whose both parents have been politicians. The reader should note that the sample becomes much smaller given that it is uncommon for both mother, father and child to be nominated politicians. The estimated coefficients in Table 2 suggest that mothers matter most overall, but there is heterogeneous effects with regards to gender. Males are roughly equally affected by

Table 2: Intergenerational correlations. Mothers and fathers are both politicians

	(1) Center-right	(2) Center-right	(3) Center-right	(4) Center-left	(5) Center-left	(6) Center-left
Center-right Mother	0.493*** (0.019)	0.435*** (0.028)	0.559*** (0.025)			
Center-right Father	0.395*** (0.019)	0.432*** (0.027)	0.351*** (0.025)			
Center-left Mother				0.463*** (0.021)	0.418*** (0.032)	0.502*** (0.028)
Center-left Father				0.418*** (0.021)	0.436*** (0.032)	0.403*** (0.028)
Constant	0.044*** (0.006)	0.060*** (0.010)	0.031*** (0.008)	0.048*** (0.004)	0.047*** (0.006)	0.049*** (0.006)
Mean dep.var.	0.596	0.623	0.567	0.323	0.288	0.360
Sample	All	Males	Females	All	Males	Females
Election year FE	No	No	No	No	No	No
Muni. FE nom.	No	No	No	No	No	No
R2	0.735	0.690	0.782	0.734	0.694	0.772
Observations	4305	2227	2078	4305	2227	2078

Standard errors in parenthesis. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

their mothers and fathers, but the intergenerational transmission between females and mothers is larger than the intergenerational transmission between females and fathers.

We now take this benchmark analysis one step further by focusing on the extended family and thus taking into account multiple generations. We also estimate the correlation for siblings and grandparents. These variables are defined as the number of siblings or grandparents that either belongs to the center-right bloc or the center-left bloc. First we add these variables into the regression separately and then together with the variable for parents. The results are presented in table 3. Interestingly, there is an intergenerational correlation between grandparents and grandchildren which suggests that the path-dependency of political party affiliation is actually pronounced over multiple generations. There is also an intra-generational correlation between siblings. In column 3 and 6 in Table 3, all family ties are included simultaneously. It is not surprising to see that a large part of the effect from grand parents is mediated through the intermediate generation (the parents). However, a positive coefficient still remains for the grandparents when conditioning on the parents and the siblings. If one takes into account that there are four grand parents and only two parents, the total effect from the grand parents should roughly equal half the effect from the parents.

We have also run an analysis where we disentangle the correlation between different grandparents which thus enables us to investigate whether they yield different correlations. The results are presented in table A9 in the appendix. The overall conclusion is that maternal and paternal grandparents' political bloc have

Table 3: Dynastic correlations: Individuals, parents, siblings and grandparents

	(1) Center-right	(2) Center-right	(3) Center-right	(4) Center-left	(5) Center-left	(6) Center-left
Center-right Grand parents	0.322*** (0.012)		0.125*** (0.007)			
Center-right Siblings		0.410*** (0.004)	0.335*** (0.003)			
Center-right Parents			0.489*** (0.004)			
Center-left Grand parents				0.326*** (0.013)		0.179*** (0.009)
Red-green Siblings					0.492*** (0.004)	0.410*** (0.004)
Center-left Parents						0.601*** (0.005)
Constant	0.274*** (0.011)	0.288*** (0.004)	0.257*** (0.003)	0.237*** (0.009)	0.152*** (0.003)	0.153*** (0.002)
Mean dep.var.	0.492	0.575	0.550	0.363	0.346	0.359
Election year FE	No	No	No	No	No	No
Muni. FE nom.	No	No	No	No	No	No
R2	0.172	0.330	0.365	0.150	0.354	0.395
Observations	3386	24817	44246	3386	24817	44246

Standard errors in parenthesis. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

roughly the same correlation with the individual’s political bloc affiliation. The reader also find the benchmark results for each political party separately in the appendix.

We have now concluded that there is a strong intergenerational correlation with regards to political affiliation within the family. Before we continue to the mechanisms behind these results, we present some robustness analysis in the next section.

6.2 Robustness analysis for the benchmark results

The primary focus on this subsection is to address some potential concerns related to the benchmark analysis. It is not uncommon in smaller municipalities where there is not much competition that political parties have difficulties filling their lists before an election. Someone could in such an institutional setting convince his or her child (if over 18 years old) to put the name in the bottom of the party list, to “fill out the slots” without risking being elected in the end. This may be beneficial for the political party since the age of the candidates are printed on the ballot, meaning that the political party can signal to the voters that they do not only consist of old people. If this is the case, the correlations estimated in the last subsection is not the results of an actual intergenerational transmission, but instead of strategic behavior among certain politicians that are also parents.

We address this concern in three different ways, with the overall conclusion that

the results presented in the main result section is not affected much. All regression tables are presented in the appendix. First we focus specifically on those candidates that are a bit older (defined as over 30), because we believe adults are less likely to stand on a list as a favor to their parents. The results are presented in Table A10. The intergenerational correlation in this table is very similar in comparison to Table 1. Second, we focus on those individuals placed at the top half of the party list. For these positions, there should not exist candidates that are only on the list to fill out the slots for symbolic reasons. Looking at Table A11, the intergenerational correlation is very similar to the one estimated in Table 1. Third, we divide the sample into those who are nominated in the same municipality as the parents and those who are not. The idea is that we would not expect individuals to run for office as a favor, if their parents are or have been politically active in another municipality. The results are presented in Table A12. The results differ quite a lot depending on the municipality in which you first ran for office. The estimated correlation is higher if you ran for office in the same municipality in comparison to a case where you ran in a different municipality. This results may be driven by the fact that you did not lived with the politician parent in question during childhood; a mechanisms that we return to in the next subsection.

6.3 Addressing the mechanisms

We have now concluded that there is a strong intergenerational correlation with regards to political affiliation. How may we explain this correlation? Let us return to the empirical testable statements that we made in the theoretical section.

The first statement concerned the sociological pathway. In order for the sociological pathway to have empirical support, the intergenerational correlation should be weaker if the child did not grow up with the politically nominated parent. We test this by including a dummy for whether the individual lived together with the politician parent and an interaction with the politician parent dummy. The results are presented in Table 4. What we find is a clear negative and substantial interaction effect which should be interpreted as a unit increase in both having a central-right/center-left parent and not living with the politician parent in question. Adding these coefficients together clearly display that the probability of running for a center-right political party decreases in comparison to the benchmark results if the individual did not lived with the center-right politician in question during childhood. The same results are found for the center-left. This yields empirical support for the sociological pathway. It is however interesting to note that the intergenerational correlation of political affiliation is still large even if the individual in question did not lived with the politician parent. In conclusion, the sociological pathway may explain part of total mechanism, but it does not tell the whole story.

Table 4: Sociological pathway: Intergenerational correlations with indicator for not living with politician parent

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Center-right	Center-right	Center-left	Center-left
Center-right Parents	0.786*** (0.005)	0.769*** (0.005)		
Not living with par.	0.074*** (0.018)	0.091*** (0.018)	0.110*** (0.019)	0.118*** (0.019)
Center-right Parents \times Not living with par.	-0.284*** (0.026)	-0.279*** (0.026)		
Center-left Parents			0.767*** (0.004)	0.762*** (0.005)
Center-left Parents \times Not living with par.			-0.239*** (0.026)	-0.245*** (0.026)
Constant	0.085*** (0.004)	0.094*** (0.035)	0.082*** (0.003)	0.119*** (0.034)
Mean dep.var.	0.583	0.583	0.366	0.365
Muni. FE nom.	No	Yes	No	Yes
Election year FE	No	Yes	No	Yes
R2	0.580	0.594	0.582	0.590
Observations	22196	22162	22196	22162

Standard errors in parenthesis. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Let us now continue to the materialistic pathway. It is logical to begin with the – admittedly redundant – test whether there is a correlation of income over the generations for the individuals included in our data set. Such a correlation constitute the foundation for the whole discussion concerning the materialistic pathway. As demonstrated in Table 5 there is such a correlation. We have chosen to standardized income with mean 0 and standard deviation 1 for each cohort for the first year after 33 years of age. The first column includes a variable for fathers’ standardized income. The second column includes a variable for mothers’ standardized income and the third column includes both these variables simultaneously. All estimated coefficients are positive. It is interesting to note that the correlation for mother and their children is higher than the correlation for fathers and their children with regards to income.

We now move on to political affiliation and its connection to income. According to the materialistic pathway, income differences are the main mechanism behind political demand for different political blocs. In Table 6 we run an analysis where the dependent variable is political bloc affiliation and the repressor is standardized income for the individual. We also present the results for specifications with municipal and election year fixed effects given that income may have different impact across municipalities and over the election years. Looking at the estimated coefficients, we find positive associations between income and being nominated for a

Table 5: Materialistic pathway: Income correlations individuals and parents

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Std income	Std income	Std income
Std income, father	0.064*** (0.002)		0.054*** (0.003)
Std income, mother		0.124*** (0.004)	0.098*** (0.005)
Constant	0.155*** (0.003)	0.200*** (0.003)	0.177*** (0.004)
Mean dep.var.			
Sample	All	All	All
Election year FE	No	No	No
Muni. FE nom.	No	No	No
R2	0.006	0.006	0.010
Observations	110377	141758	99934

Standard errors in parenthesis. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

center-right political party and negative coefficients for between income and being nominated for a center-left political party. If we relate these results to the ones previously discussed in Table 5, we may also indirectly conclude that there is a positive correlation between the parents' income level and the probability of being nominated for a center-right bloc and a negative correlation for the center-left bloc. So far, the materialistic pathway seems to have empirical support.

The remaining – and most central regression table – for the materialistic pathway still remains. We now include income in the benchmark regression and see if the intergenerational transmission previously estimated in Table 1 is decreased when also including income as a regressor. The results are presented in Table 7. Looking at the estimated coefficients, the income variable is positive for the center-right and negative for the center-left just as before. What is telling however, is that the estimated coefficients for the parental bloc affiliation is virtually unchanged in comparison to benchmark results in Table 1. The R-squared is also very similar. The conclusion is that income cannot explain a large share of the overall intergenerational correlation between individuals and their parents with regards to political affiliation. A one standard deviation increase in income - which is a large increase - yields a 1.8 percentage points increase in the probability that

Table 6: Materialistic pathway: Correlation income and political bloc affiliation individual

	(1) Center-right	(2) Center-right	(3) Center-left	(4) Center-left
Std income	0.032*** (0.003)	0.029*** (0.003)	-0.016*** (0.003)	-0.014*** (0.003)
Constant	0.562*** (0.003)	0.510*** (0.055)	0.349*** (0.003)	0.452*** (0.054)
Mean dep.var.	0.568	0.568	0.346	0.346
Muni. FE nom.	No	Yes	No	Yes
Election year FE	No	Yes	No	Yes
R2	0.004	0.082	0.001	0.054
Observations	21274	21244	21274	21244

Standard errors in parenthesis. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

the individual is nominated for a center-right political party. The same increase in income yields a decrease of 0.7 percentage points in the probability of being nominated for the center-left bloc.

Table 7: Materialistic pathway: Intergenerational correlations individuals and parents with income

	(1) Center-right	(2) Center-right	(3) Center-left	(4) Center-left
Center-right Parents	0.746*** (0.005)	0.727*** (0.005)		
Std income	0.018*** (0.002)	0.016*** (0.002)	-0.007*** (0.002)	-0.006*** (0.002)
Center-left Parents			0.742*** (0.005)	0.733*** (0.005)
Constant	0.115*** (0.004)	0.122*** (0.038)	0.100*** (0.003)	0.137*** (0.037)
Mean dep.var.	0.568	0.568	0.346	0.346
Muni. FE nom.	No	Yes	No	Yes
Election year FE	No	Yes	No	Yes
R2	0.547	0.563	0.541	0.551
Observations	21274	21244	21274	21244

Standard errors in parenthesis. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

To sum up, the materialistic pathway do have some empirical support, where the signs in the empirical analysis points in the direction of the theoretical predictions. However, the sociological pathway seems to have a much larger impact. Not living with the parents during childhood yields a much lower intergenerational correlation of political affiliation in comparison to the results for income.

7 Discussion and conclusion

Understanding how political beliefs are formed constitute one of the central themes in political science since the question addresses the fundamental issue to what degree an open debate and deliberation may affect the public opinion. The focus on our part has been on the intergenerational aspects of political transmission. We have applied rich register data from Sweden and studied how political affiliation, defined as being nominated for a political bloc, is correlated within the family. The results from this empirical endeavor are that the intergenerational correlation is very strong. These results might be seen as both unsurprising given that parents are likely to play an important role in a person's life, but also as a bit troublesome since it somewhat goes against the ideal that each citizens should (rationally) take part of the political discussion and then form his or her political beliefs based on this. We have also disentangled this correlation by also separating between mothers and fathers where we found some evidence that mothers' political affiliation matters more – especially for females. We have furthermore demonstrated that the intergenerational correlation is not only present between individuals and their parents, but also between individuals and their grandparents and between siblings. This indicates that transmission of political affiliation takes different pathways and reinforces itself throughout difference channels in proximity to the individual.

The second aim of this paper was to connect to a theoretical discussion of *how* this intergenerational transmission manifests itself. We started out by first discussing a sociological explanation where discussions at home together with parents or with peers are the key drivers behind political socialization. Then we discussed in terms of a more formalized rational choice framework another explanation where relative difference in income is the key to understanding political demands. Because income according to this framework is inherited across the generation, so will also political affiliation.

When we brought these empirical predictions to the data we found that the intergenerational correlation decreased substantially when an individual had not lived together with the politician parent in question. If the individual has had less opportunity to discuss politics at home with the politician parent, this is exactly what we would suspect according to the sociological pathway. When we tested the materialistic pathway, we did find partial support for some of its elements. Income

is empirically correlated across generations and individuals with higher relative incomes are more likely to be nominated for a central-right political party. When we add all this together however, the benchmark intergenerational correlation is virtually unaffected by inclusion of income although the estimated coefficient for the income variable has the correct sign according to the materialistic pathway.

In conclusion, we have not falsified the materialistic hypothesis, but this pathway seems to play a much less pronounced role in explaining the intergenerational correlation in comparison to the sociological pathway. We should also highlight that a strong intergenerational correlation remains even when conditioning on not living with the politician parent in question. Works remains to be done before we have fully grasped the intergenerational transmission of political affiliation.

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Appendix

Each political party separately

This subsequent tables corresponds to the Table 1 but we estimate the intergenerational correlation for each political party separately.

Table A1: Benchmark correlation on the political party level: Moderate Party

	(1) Moderate	(2) Moderate
Moderate Parents	0.686*** (0.005)	0.679*** (0.005)
Constant	0.054*** (0.002)	0.050* (0.029)
Mean dep.var.	0.161	0.161
Muni. FE nom.	No	Yes
Election year FE	No	Yes
R2	0.458	0.468
Observations	23957	23917

Standard errors in parenthesis. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Table A2: Benchmark correlation on the political party level: Christian Democrats

	(1) Christian Democrat	(2) Christian Democrat
Christian Democrat Parents	0.776*** (0.004)	0.765*** (0.004)
Constant	0.028*** (0.001)	0.026 (0.022)
Mean dep.var.	0.125	0.125
Muni. FE nom.	No	Yes
Election year FE	No	Yes
R2	0.602	0.612
Observations	23957	23917

Standard errors in parenthesis. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Table A3: Benchmark correlation on the political party level: Liberal Party

	(1) Liberal	(2) Liberal
Liberal Parents	0.592*** (0.005)	0.583*** (0.005)
Constant	0.031*** (0.002)	0.037 (0.025)
Mean dep.var.	0.096	0.096
Muni. FE nom.	No	Yes
Election year FE	No	Yes
R2	0.397	0.409
Observations	23957	23917

Standard errors in parenthesis. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Table A4: Benchmark correlation on the political party level: Center Party

	(1) Center Party	(2) Center Party
Center Party Parents	0.704*** (0.004)	0.693*** (0.004)
Constant	0.030*** (0.002)	0.031 (0.027)
Mean dep.var.	0.172	0.173
Muni. FE nom.	No	Yes
Election year FE	No	Yes
R2	0.561	0.572
Observations	23957	23917

Standard errors in parenthesis. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Table A5: Benchmark correlation on the political party level: Social Democrats

	(1)	(2)
	Social Democrat	Social Democrat
Social Democrat Parents	0.690*** (0.004)	0.686*** (0.004)
Constant	0.050*** (0.002)	0.038 (0.031)
Mean dep.var.	0.221	0.221
Muni. FE nom.	No	Yes
Election year FE	No	Yes
R2	0.515	0.525
Observations	23957	23917

Standard errors in parenthesis. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table A6: Benchmark correlation on the political party level: Green Party

	(1)	(2)
	Green Party	Green Party
Green Party Parents	0.633*** (0.007)	0.624*** (0.007)
Constant	0.032*** (0.001)	0.075*** (0.021)
Mean dep.var.	0.056	0.056
Muni. FE nom.	No	Yes
Election year FE	No	Yes
R2	0.279	0.296
Observations	23957	23917

Standard errors in parenthesis. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table A7: Benchmark correlation on the political party level: Left Party

	(1) Left party	(2) Left party
Left party Parents	0.655*** (0.006)	0.645*** (0.006)
Constant	0.036*** (0.001)	0.066*** (0.023)
Mean dep.var.	0.074	0.074
Muni. FE nom.	No	Yes
Election year FE	No	Yes
R2	0.343	0.358
Observations	23957	23917

Standard errors in parenthesis. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Table A8: Benchmark correlation on the political party level: Sweden Democrats

	(1) Sweden Democrat	(2) Sweden Democrat
Sweden Democrat Parents	0.631*** (0.007)	0.603*** (0.007)
Constant	0.013*** (0.001)	-0.021 (0.013)
Mean dep.var.	0.021	0.021
Muni. FE nom.	No	Yes
Election year FE	No	Yes
R2	0.230	0.265
Observations	23957	23917

Standard errors in parenthesis. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Dynastic correlations for each grand parent separately

Table A9: Dynastic correlations: Grandparents in separate regressions

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	Center-right	Center-right	Center-right	Center-right	Center-left	Center-left	Center-left	Center-left
Center-right Mother's mother	0.448*** (0.029)							
Center-right Father's mother		0.455*** (0.035)						
Center-right Mother's father			0.439*** (0.026)					
Center-right Father's father				0.473*** (0.029)				
Center-left Mother's mother					0.429*** (0.029)			
Center-left Father's mother						0.426*** (0.035)		
Center-left Mother's father							0.402*** (0.027)	
Center-left Father's father								0.416*** (0.029)
Constant	0.210*** (0.021)	0.221*** (0.027)	0.252*** (0.020)	0.247*** (0.023)	0.240*** (0.018)	0.202*** (0.020)	0.237*** (0.015)	0.186*** (0.016)
Mean dep.var.	0.457	0.489	0.509	0.542	0.404	0.349	0.368	0.311
Election year FE	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No
Muni. FE nom.	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No
R2	0.200	0.201	0.187	0.212	0.180	0.180	0.153	0.170
Observations	968	679	1269	995	968	679	1269	995

Standard errors in parenthesis. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Robustness analysis

Table A10: Intergenerational correlation individuals and parents. Only those over 30 years old

	(1) Center-right	(2) Center-right	(3) Center-right	(4) Center-left	(5) Center-left	(6) Center-left
Center-right Parents	0.759*** (0.004)	0.743*** (0.006)	0.775*** (0.006)			
Center-left Parents				0.750*** (0.004)	0.728*** (0.006)	0.767*** (0.006)
Constant	0.107*** (0.003)	0.127*** (0.005)	0.089*** (0.005)	0.095*** (0.003)	0.082*** (0.003)	0.110*** (0.004)
Mean dep.var.	0.554	0.584	0.520	0.351	0.309	0.399
Sample	Over 30	Males over 30	Females over 30	Over 30	Males over 30	Females over 30
Muni. FE nom.	No	No	No	No	No	No
Birthyear FE	No	No	No	No	No	No
R2	1	1	1	1	1	1
Observations	23957	12704	11253	23957	12704	11253

Standard errors in parenthesis. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Table A11: Intergenerational correlation individuals and parents. Toplist positions

	(1) Center-right	(2) Center-right	(3) Center-right	(4) Center-left	(5) Center-left	(6) Center-left
Center-right Parents	0.750*** (0.006)	0.740*** (0.009)	0.759*** (0.008)			
Center-left Parents				0.728*** (0.006)	0.713*** (0.008)	0.738*** (0.009)
Constant	0.116*** (0.005)	0.129*** (0.007)	0.104*** (0.006)	0.094*** (0.003)	0.077*** (0.005)	0.113*** (0.005)
Mean dep.var.	0.582	0.608	0.555	0.322	0.280	0.366
Sample	Top list	Males top list	Females top list	Top list	Males top list	Females top list
Muni. FE nom.	No	No	No	No	No	No
Birthyear FE	No	No	No	No	No	No
R2	1	1	1	1	1	1
Observations	13207	6777	6430	13207	6777	6430

Standard errors in parenthesis. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Table A12: Intergenerational correlation individuals and parents. Municipality restrictions

	(1) Center-right	(2) Center-left	(3) Center-right	(4) Center-left
Center-right Parents	0.838*** (0.004)		0.602*** (0.009)	
Center-left Parents		0.832*** (0.004)		0.588*** (0.009)
Constant	0.072*** (0.003)	0.057*** (0.003)	0.177*** (0.007)	0.171*** (0.006)
Mean dep.var.	0.568	0.338	0.527	0.378
Sample	Same muni	Same muni	Different muni	Different muni
Muni. FE nom.	No	No	No	No
Birthyear FE	No	No	No	No
R2	1	1	0	0
Observations	16006	16006	7951	7951

Standard errors in parenthesis. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01