

The Pipeline Is Not the Problem: A Case–Control Study of Immigrants’ Political Underrepresentation

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Abstract

Immigrants are underrepresented in most democratic parliaments. To explain the immigrant–native representation gap existing research emphasizes party gatekeepers and structural conditions. But a more complete account must consider the possibility that the representation gap already begins at the supply stage. Are immigrants simply less interested in elected office? To test this explanation, we carried out an innovative case–control survey in Sweden. We surveyed elected politicians, candidates for local office, and residents who have not run, stratified these samples by immigrant status, and linked all respondents to local political opportunity structures. We find that differences in political ambition, interest, and efficacy do not help explain immigrants’ underrepresentation. Instead, the major hurdles lie in securing a candidate nomination and being placed on an electable list position. We conclude that there is a pipeline of potential immigrant candidates, but immigrants’ ambition is thwarted by political elites.

Word count: 10,398

1 Introduction

Across advanced democracies, immigrant populations have been steadily growing over the past few decades. Within the European Union, more than one in ten residents live in a country other than the one in which they were born. In Sweden, this number reaches one in six.¹ The rise of immigrants in the population has, however, not been matched by this group's representation in electoral politics. In most countries, immigrants remain significantly underrepresented in parliaments. This underrepresentation persists even though many migrants have become citizens. Moreover, in many countries, including in Sweden, even non-citizen migrants can vote and run in local elections (Bird, Saalfeld and Wüst, 2011; Bloemraad and Schönwälder, 2013; Ruedin, 2013; Vernby, 2013). The continued underrepresentation of immigrants undermines the legitimacy of political systems. It also marginalizes the views of groups who, on many salient policy issues, hold systematically different positions than do natives (Dancygier, 2017; Mansbridge, 1999).

Social scientists have examined the sources of minority group underrepresentation, and leading explanations highlight the role of party elites. Especially in political systems where aspiring candidates require the blessing of party leaders to mount a successful run for office, these gatekeepers, scholars have argued, have decisively influenced the representation of minority groups such as immigrants, ethnic minorities, and women (Cheng and Tavits, 2011; Hazan and Rahat, 2010; Luhiste, 2015). Whether due to their own prejudice or feared adverse reactions of the electorate (Fisher et al., 2015; Street, 2014; Portmann and Stojanović, 2019), party leaders often do not place minority group members in competitive seats or on winnable list positions.

This focus on gatekeepers has been particularly salient in explaining the political underrepresentation of immigrants (Dancygier et al., 2015; Sobolewska, 2013; van der Zwan, Lubbers and Eisinga, 2019). However, for this explanation to be convincing one crucial piece of the puzzle has yet to be addressed: immigrants' interest to run for office in the first place. If systematic biases are at play in this first step of supply, existing conclusions about the causes of underrepresentation lying at the nomination or election stage may very well be flawed. This problem of candidate emergence has been highlighted in the political underrepresentation of women. Some have argued that the reticence of women to throw their hat in the ring can better account for the shortage of female politicians than can prejudicial attitudes on the part of voters and party gatekeepers (Kage, Rosenbluth and Tanaka, 2018; Lawless and Fox, 2010).²

There are reasons to believe that supply constraints are especially salient among immigrants. Migrants settling in a new country might prioritize their economic and social integration over their political engagement. Many of them also confront unfamiliar political environments and electoral institutions. Indeed, three quarters of Swedes think that

¹Data based on Eurostat; see https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/People_in_the_EU_-_statistics_on_origin_of_residents.

²These studies also emphasize, however, that while voters and elites may not discriminate against women candidates per se, more deep-seated stereotypes about traditional gender roles do hold women back (see also Teele, Kalla and Rosenbluth, 2018).

immigrants are underrepresented in elected office because they are unfamiliar with Swedish politics.³ If this is correct, researchers may have been too quick to put the blame on party leaders; immigrants may simply show less interest in becoming politically active and holding elected office.

Can supply-side accounts better explain immigrants' political underrepresentation than those highlighting discriminatory party elites? Existing research examines aggregate statistics of legislatures or candidate pools and importantly establishes the extent of underrepresentation and its connection to party gatekeepers or structural factors, but it cannot speak to the question of supply and to the individual-level characteristics that lead immigrants to enter the political fray in the first place.⁴

Furthermore, most work tends to focus on one stage of the representation process. But to better capture the relative importance of supply and demand factors, studies need to trace the multiple stages that ultimately lead to election, beginning with an individual's predisposition to even consider running for office, to their decision to join and be active in a party, to their likelihood of being nominated and, finally, elected. Studying this process is challenging for at least three reasons. First, it involves a targeted sampling of candidates and elected politicians along with a sample of individuals who have never run and an oversample of minority respondents. Second, it requires surveying a very large number of individuals. After all, most respondents are not expected to consider a run for office and an even smaller number is nominated and wins. Third, since structural forces influence representation, it is important to place each stage within the relevant local political context.

We overcome these challenges by conducting a unique, registry-linked survey of over 6,300 individuals in Sweden. Our survey advances existing research in two critical ways: First, it measures individual-level factors that have been cited as important determinants of participation in electoral politics – including, motivation, political socialization and political interest – but that typically remain unobserved in studies of underrepresentation. Second, because we can link individual respondents to richly-detailed population-wide registry data, we are able to employ a case-control study, a design that is typically used in epidemiology to examine individual-level rare events. In our case, this design stratifies our sample such that it contains both a large number of candidates who have been nominated for and elected to municipal office and a sizable number of immigrants (3,455 candidates and 2,280 immigrants). This approach permits us to draw novel and more robust inferences about the stage in the winnowing process at which minority candidates begin to disappear and how contextual factors intervene in this process.

Our main findings are as follows. First, differences in engagement in politics and political ambition cannot explain the immigrant-native representation gap. Our survey demonstrates that immigrants are no less interested, and frequently show more interest, in political matters than do natives. They are also slightly more likely to grow up in environments in which politics is discussed. Further, they exhibit only somewhat lower levels of political efficacy,

³This statistic is taken from our own survey; see Section 3 for details. For a discussion of supply constraints among immigrants, see Bloemraad (2013) and Norris and Lovenduski (1995).

⁴For examples, see Bird, Saalfeld and Wüst (2011) and Section 2.

and discuss politics as frequently as natives, two other important predictors of becoming a politician. In line with these characteristics, immigrants’ are no less interested than natives in running for office.

At what stage of the process, then, do immigrants get stuck? Our second key finding is that the major hurdles for immigrants lie at (i) the nomination stage and (ii) in transitioning from being nominated to being placed on an electable position. On the whole, our findings challenge supply-side explanations and provide more convincing support for the notion that it is party gatekeepers who undermine immigrants’ chances to hold elected office. Immigrants do want to enter electoral politics, but are thwarted by party elites.

These findings withstand several robustness checks: They hold whether or not we examine immigrants from developed or developing countries; when we only examine the most qualified immigrants; when we take party membership into account; when we relax assumptions about sequencing (i.e., whether party membership precedes or follows interest in elected office); and when we consider that immigrants’ anticipated discrimination by politicians could influence supply.

Our study advances existing literature in several ways. First, to the best of our knowledge ours is the first survey that systematically probes whether and how a wide range of behavioral and attitudinal characteristics are associated with immigrants’ entry into electoral politics. In addition to political activity and ambition, our survey taps supply-side variables such as political interest, efficacy and networks allowing us to draw a richer and more nuanced picture than has been feasible to date.

Second, our research builds on Lawless and Fox (2010) who surveyed thousands of individuals in four professions that are overrepresented in politics to establish the roots of the gender gap in office-holding in the US. Going beyond this pioneering work, our case-control design permits us to avoid limiting our analysis to such “springboard professions,” an important innovation since pathways into office can differ across groups. The design also helps us to better assess whether candidates and elected politicians differ in significant ways from individuals who never ran for office, and whether these differences vary across immigrants and natives.

Finally, because we are able to link our survey to registry data, we can embed politicians, candidates, and individuals who have not run for office into their local political environments. Unlike existing work, we can thus study how structural factors (e.g., related to parties, elections, and electoral systems) intervene in both the candidate emergence and in the election process.

To situate our study, Section 2 provides a brief review of existing work. Section 3 presents the research design and case. In Section 4 we present our main results and robustness check. Section 5 concludes with a discussion of this study’s implications for future work.

2 Existing Approaches

Broadly speaking, research on the political representation of immigrants highlights three sets of factors: (1) the context or political opportunity structure; (2) the preferences of native

voters and party gatekeepers for immigrant candidates; (3) and the political behavior of immigrants themselves. Existing research has examined whether contextual factors influence the electoral advancements of immigrants and minority groups more generally. This line of work typically relies on data such as the composition of legislatures or candidate pools and tests whether these measures correlate with certain institutional and contextual variables. For instance, variation in the permissiveness of national citizenship and integration regimes has been shown to affect immigrant–native representation gaps (e.g. Bird, Saalfeld and Wüst, 2011; Dancygier, 2017; Garbaye, 2005). Within countries, electoral rules – e.g., district-based vs. at-large elections, preference voting – can also affect the electoral power and descriptive representation of immigrant-origin minorities (Bird, 2005; Dancygier, 2014; Portmann and Stojanović, 2019; Trounstein and Valdini, 2008). Additionally, studies suggest that increases in legislative size raise minority representation (Dancygier et al., 2015; Marschall, Ruhil and Shah, 2010), perhaps by allowing party leaders more flexibility in balancing the slate.

This balancing mechanism suggests that party leaders with influence over the nomination process can be critical actors, and research indeed documents that party gatekeepers may place immigrants on less competitive slots or not place them at all (e.g. Dancygier, 2014; Norris and Lovenduski, 1995; Soininen, 2011; van der Zwan, Lubbers and Eisinga, 2019). In some cases, this discriminatory behavior is a function of anticipated voter prejudice: Several studies have found that segments of the native electorate prefer native candidates over those with foreign roots.⁵ In other cases, party leaders harbor reservations against the inclusion of immigrant candidates, irrespective of voter resentment. They may hold prejudicial views themselves or fear that the entry of a new group could erode their power. Alternatively, homophily – rather than willful exclusion – may be at work. If the networks and neighborhoods in which party gatekeepers operate feature few immigrants, these elites may fall back on the more familiar native candidate pool.⁶ On the flipside, party gatekeepers have also actively supported the recruitment of immigrant candidates, in particular when they view immigrant electorates as key to their party’s success at the polls. Studies of immigrants’ political organization, especially at the local level, frequently make this case, but also note party elites’ tokenistic approach to immigrant candidates.⁷

Taken together, these varied approaches support the idea that party leaders do not treat prospective immigrant and native candidates equally, but we do not have a full understanding of the nature of this inequality. In particular, studies have not been able to rule out that immigrants are simply less interested in putting themselves forward. They also do not trace the multiple stages of the candidate emergence process, making it difficult to assess at what juncture immigrants drop out. For instance, though studies that examine whole slates

⁵See, for instance, Fisher et al. (2015), Portmann and Stojanović (2019) and Street (2014). But see Bueno and Dunning (2017) who instead draw attention to white candidates’ superior access to financial resources to explain ethnic minority underrepresentation in Brazil.

⁶For a nuanced approach on the treatment of minority candidates by elites see, for example, Brouard and Tiberj (2011), Cheng and Tavits (2011), Eelbode et al. (2013), Sanbonmatsu (2006), and van der Zwan, Lubbers and Eisinga (2019).

⁷See, for example, Dancygier (2017), Eelbode et al. (2013), Garbaye (2005), Maxwell (2012), Michon and Vermeulen (2013), Sobolewska (2013) and Teney et al. (2010).

of nominated candidates (vs. the composition of legislatures) are useful in establishing inequalities at the nomination stage, they do not consider the pool of potential candidates from which party gatekeepers were able to draw.

This omission is potentially critical, for party elites have made claims that minority candidates, including those of immigrant background, are simply less likely to run.⁸ By implication, to make the case that elite (or voter) discrimination leads to representation gaps scholars sometimes implicitly assume that immigrant and native candidates are more or less equal, save for their country of birth. Yet, elites who confront greater difficulties in recruiting immigrant than native candidates might end up nominating immigrant candidates who have less political experience or motivation to run for office.

In short, even though the election of immigrant candidates is a multi-stage process, scholars have thus far mostly neglected the key first stage of candidate supply. To what extent, then, is immigrant underrepresentation a pipeline problem? To answer this question we first have to address whether immigrants and natives differ in their ability and propensity to run for office. With respect to ability, a recent study suggests that differences in human capital and other socio-demographic characteristics cannot explain immigrant–native representation gaps. Drawing on the entire adult population in Sweden, Dancygier et al. (2015) examine whether individual-level resources – such as education or income – are associated with running for and winning municipal office.⁹ Though the study convincingly demonstrates that these observable individual resources do not drive representational inequalities, it cannot rule out possibly significant unmeasured factors, such as political interest and ambition. It therefore ultimately leaves unanswered the important questions of whether immigrants are as likely as natives to be politically engaged and to have considered running for office or whether they differ in other, heretofore unobserved factors, that make them less viable candidates.

Research on the underrepresentation of women in turn suggests that differences in political interest and ambition are quite consequential. In their innovative survey and interviews of eligible individuals in the US, Lawless and Fox (2010, 13) find that women are considerably less likely than men to express a desire to run for office and that it is this difference in ambition – more so than elite or voter prejudice – that is crucial. Deep-seated patterns of “traditional gender socialization,” they further conclude, “serve as the major source of the substantial gender gap in eligible candidates’ political ambition.”¹⁰

Do analogous forces stunt immigrants’ electoral representation? Like women, immigrants often live in societies in which members of their group are not well represented in leadership positions and where stereotypes about appropriate professional and public roles are widespread (e.g., Maxwell, 2017). Moreover, immigrants face additional challenges in that they have to navigate a new country, including an unfamiliar political system. The twin pres-

⁸See, e.g., Norris and Lovenduski (1995). Note also Shah (2014) on the importance of candidate supply in the case of African Americans.

⁹The study mainly presents data on winning office, but notes that results are very similar when examining the nomination stage.

¹⁰Hayes and Lawless (2016) further find that American media and voters do not treat women candidates differently than they do male candidates.

asures of societal expectations and of integrating into a new environment could substantially reduce immigrants’ political engagement and interest in running for office.

Evaluating whether immigrants’ interest in politics or desire to run for office is more important in producing representational inequalities than are steps that emerge later in the election process is fundamental to establishing the sources of underrepresentation, but it is also quite difficult empirically. We next discuss how our study overcomes this challenge.

3 Case and Methodology

3.1 The Case–Control Design

We situate our study in Sweden. Sweden in many ways typifies the West European immigration experience: its immigrant population consists mainly of labor migrants, asylum seekers, and those coming for family reasons, and it hails from developed and developing countries. As elsewhere, Swedish immigrants experience discrimination in the social and economic sphere, and, even though they have long been able to vote and run in local elections, immigrants remain significantly underrepresented in elected office.¹¹ In 2014, the parity ratio at the municipal level (the share of a group in the legislature divided by its share in the population) was 0.45 for immigrants and 1.11 for natives. Lastly, similar to many other European electoral systems, local elections – the focus of our study – operate via a party-list proportional system, and party elites in charge of list placement greatly influence candidates’ election prospects (Dancygier et al., 2015; Folke, Persson and Rickne, 2016).

Though Dancygier et al. (2015) show that variables such as immigrants’ education, income, employment, or their place of residence (and associated electoral and institutional context) do not close the representation gap, for research on immigrants’ political representation in Sweden – and elsewhere – to make progress, we ultimately need to hear from immigrants themselves.¹² Specifically, we have to establish why immigrants who have the time and resources to stand for election do not end up running and winning. Is it because they simply lack interest in politics? Do they not consider joining parties and competing for office? Do they feel they lack the qualifications for a career in electoral politics? And how do these previously unmeasured experiences and perceptions compare to those of natives with similar background characteristics?

Answering these questions proves methodologically difficult; fielding a nationally representative survey would yield too few individuals that have been nominated for office. We address this problem by drawing on work in the field of epidemiology and conduct a so-

¹¹On social and economic discrimination, see Vernby and Dancygier (Forthcoming) and Bengtsson, Iverman and Hinnerich (2012). On immigrant voting rights, see Vernby (2013) on Sweden and Geyer (2007) on Europe.

¹²Dancygier and colleagues’ study (2015) ends in 2010, while our survey targets respondents based on 2014 local elections. When we replicate Dancygier et al. (2015) for the year 2014 (See Appendix C) we find that the immigrant–native representation gap and its determinants are very similar to those observed in earlier years.

called case–control study (e.g. King and Zeng, 2001; Keogh and Cox, 2014).¹³ Case–control designs are useful when the outcome of interest is rare in the population under study.¹⁴ If the researcher has reliable information on the outcome for all units in the population, this information can be used to take a random sample of the population where the outcome of interest is present (the “cases”) and a random sample of the population where the outcome is absent (the “controls”). In the study of representation, individuals running for office are the “cases” and those not running are the “controls.” The researcher can then go on to collect previously unmeasured data on the characteristics of the “cases” and “controls” and, after making appropriate adjustments, analyze their correlation with the outcome of interest.

The case control approach holds promise for students of political representation as it provides a more efficient way to collect detailed information on the potential drivers of the rare outcomes of interest, namely standing for and winning election. However, this strategy relies on having access to reliable population-wide data on who has and who has not been nominated/elected, information which is difficult to come by even in many advanced democracies.

We therefore turn to Sweden, where such data are available in government registers, allowing us to sample a large number of “case” as well as “controls.”¹⁵ We then administer surveys to both of these groups to measure variables unavailable in government registers, such as political socialization, interest, and efficacy, among other things. The case control study helps us pinpoint which attitudes, perceptions, and experiences are relevant for becoming an elected politician.

Another important challenge in research on minority representation relates to obtaining a large enough sample of individuals belonging to the group of interest. Without oversampling minority populations, estimates of differences between minority and majority group members will be statistically underpowered. We therefore use population-wide registry data to stratify both the sample of “cases” and “controls,” such that the sample contains a significant number of immigrants. This step is crucial given our goal of examining whether there are any group differences with respect to the attitudes, perceptions, and experiences that potentially matter for seeking elected office.¹⁶

The sample frame included all individuals who were eligible to vote and run in the 2014

¹³For a rare example of a case–control study in political science, see Rosenfeld (2017) on pro-democratic demonstrations in Russia.

¹⁴During the last two decades, and for any given election, around 0.2 percent of the eligible population, has been elected to municipal office. The corresponding figure for being nominated is between 0.7 and 0.8 percent (Dancygier et al., 2015).

¹⁵Because of the completeness of our registry data, we can avoid a situation where we do not know whether the selected controls had been nominated/elected. The latter are referred to as “contaminated” controls in the methodological literature (Lancaster and Imbens, 1996) and would require alternative estimation techniques whose properties are less well known than are standard methods.

¹⁶Because we are combining a case–control study with stratified sampling, certain adjustments in the statistical analyses are made. The fact that we know the exact distribution of “cases” and “controls” as well as immigrants and natives in the population enables us to weight each observation by the inverse of its sampling probability (so-called design weights).

local elections.¹⁷ We used six strata, where each stratum is defined by being nominated in 2014 (yes or no) and background or country of birth (immigrant, Swedish-born with at least one foreign-born parent and Swedish-born with both parents born in Sweden).¹⁸ The survey was administered by *Statistics Sweden* and was sent to a simple random sample taken from each stratum. Data collection took place between May and September 2017 and used a combination of web-based and postal surveys. Respondents were contacted via mail, and a first invitation contained log-in information to a web-version of our survey whereas the remaining four participation reminders also contained mail-in postal surveys. The survey was administered in Swedish.¹⁹

We selected 16,000 individuals for participation in our study and received answers from 6,386 individuals, corresponding to a response rate of 40 percent. To reduce non-response bias, *Statistics Sweden* provided us with weights that have been recalibrated to minimize the difference between the (weighted) respondents and the entire population in the same stratum with respect to relevant registry data.²⁰ In Appendix B we compare the distribution of a number of key registry variables measuring socio-economic, demographic and family status among our respondents to the corresponding distribution in the population of interest, showing that they are, indeed, close to each other.

Finally, our response rate is somewhat lower than Sweden’s largest and most well-known public opinion survey by *SOM* (Society Opinion Media), which has been fielded annually since 1986, and which has had a response rate ranging between 48% and 53% during the last three years (Bové, 2017; Tipple, 2018).²¹ In anticipation of this scenario, we included a number of questions that are also fielded by *SOM*, which allows us to compare our response distributions on these questions to theirs. Our analysis shows that the response distributions for a number of key variables in our survey (societal trust, ideological orientation and political interest) closely track those found by the *SOM*-study (See Appendix B).

3.2 Surveys and Registry Data

The survey has four parts, each containing a number of items covering, respectively: (1) political interest and networks; (2) political participation; (3) political attitudes; and (4)

¹⁷The local franchise is not conditioned on Swedish citizenship. Instead, residents 18 years or older are eligible to vote and run in local elections in the municipality where they reside if they are EU (or Icelandic or Norwegian) citizens, or if they have been a Swedish resident for three or more years.

¹⁸In this paper we will merge the two groups of Swedish-born into one and focus our analysis on the difference between immigrants and “natives”. As Table D.7 and Figure D.6 in the Appendix show, our main conclusions remain unchanged when distinguishing between natives with and without foreign-born parents.

¹⁹While this may constitute a barrier for some immigrant respondents, a certain level of knowledge of Swedish is, in all likelihood, necessary for an individual to even be considered for public office.

²⁰The variables used for the calibration are age and sex (five age groups per sex), time in Sweden (four categories), a binary indicator of Swedish citizenship, country of birth (three categories), size of municipality (three categories), education (three categories), a binary indicator for being employed, income (three categories) and seats per voter in the home municipality (quartiles). Unless otherwise stated, all our analyses are conducted using the calibration weights.

²¹The survey by *SOM* uses more reminders (via mail and text messages) as well financial rewards in the form of lottery tickets or gift cards.

background characteristics. Based on these survey items, we constructed a number of indices measuring individual characteristics that are frequently connected with political participation. Following the literature calling for increased scrutiny of the motivations of migrants and other minorities (e.g. Bloemraad and Schönwälder, 2013), we measure various forms of respondents’ engagement in politics (Brady, Verba and Schlozman, 1995).²² The resulting indices and their component measures are summarized in Table 1 and motivated below (additional details on the index construction are in Appendix A).

Internal and external political efficacy. Because of data limitations, research on representational inequalities has rarely examined the role of political efficacy (but see Lawless and Fox (2010) on the importance of “self-perceived qualifications”). Political efficacy refers to the individuals’ beliefs in their ability to influence the political system. Scholars traditionally distinguish internal from external efficacy (Craig and Maggiotto, 1982; Pollock III, 1983). The former refers to the individuals’ beliefs in their own competence whereas the latter refers to their beliefs in the responsiveness of the political system. While conceptually distinct, both internal and external efficacy are strongly related to measures of political participation (Abramson, 1983; Verba, Schlozman and Brady, 1995). In our case, we use four indicators to construct the index of *Internal political efficacy* and five indicators for the index of *External political efficacy*.

Political interest. Citizens who are interested in politics participate more than those who are not (Pattie, Seyd and Whiteley, 2003; Prior, 2018; Verba, Schlozman and Brady, 1995). Differences in political interest have therefore been put forward as an explanation for variation in political ambition between natives and immigrants (Reny and Shah, 2018). We construct an index that combines items measuring interest in politics at various levels (from the local to the global) and also include a measure of general political interest.

Political discussion networks. Political discussion networks facilitate the flow of political information (Huckfeldt and Sprague, 1987) and are also strongly related to psychological engagement in politics (La Due Lake and Huckfeldt, 1998; McClurg, 2003). We created an index consisting of six questions intended to measure the extent of respondents’ political discussion networks, including the frequency of discussion with various types of interlocutors, ranging from friends and family to politically active individuals.

Political socialization. Finally, we also include a measure of pre-adult socialization capturing the extent to which an individual has had a politicized upbringing. In particular, we include an item capturing whether respondents discussed political affairs with their parents when growing up, assuming that such discussions will have a positive effect on engagement in politics at later stages in life (see Lawless and Fox (2010) on this point, and the predictive power of pre-adult socialization on the likelihood of becoming a politician).

All indices are unweighted averages of a set of survey items and rescaled so that they range from 0 to 1. The scales are reliable by conventional standards: Cronbach’s alpha ranged from 0.80 (*discussion networks*) to 0.94 (*internal efficacy*). Further details can be

²²While Brady, Verba and Schlozman (1995) emphasize political recruitment (alongside resources and political engagement) as a determinant of political participation, we limit ourselves to studying the effects of engagement (and resources) as a consequence our focus on testing the supply-side explanation of immigrant underrepresentation we focus on political engagement.

Table 1: Summary of indices measuring engagement in politics and their component items

Internal efficacy
<i>To what degree do you agree with the following propositions? (11-point response scales)</i>
–I am qualified enough to engage in politics
–I have a good understanding of the major issues
–I would be as good a politician as others
–I know more about politics than others do
External efficacy
<i>To what degree do you agree with the following propositions? (11-point response scales)</i>
–Most people can affect political decisions
–Politicians care about the citizens’ opinions
–Politicians usually do what most of the people would like them to do
–Citizens can affect policy through elections
Political interest
<i>Generally speaking, how interested are you in politics? (4-point response scale)</i>
<i>How interested are you when it comes to... (11-point response scales)</i>
–municipal politics?
–county politics?
–Swedish politics?
–EU politics?
–politics outside EU?
Discussion networks
<i>How often do you discuss politics with... (4-point response scales)</i>
–your colleagues?
–your friends?
–your family?
–elected politicians?
–others who are politically involved?
–someone else?
Socialization
<i>When growing up, how often did your parents discuss politics with you? (4-point response scale)</i>

found in Appendix A.

Apart from these indices, we ask respondents for their political party preference as the probability of office-holding depends in part on the party one seeks to represent. Furthermore, party preference and immigrant status are correlated (with immigrants being more likely to support leftist parties).

To measure the importance of individual resources we follow Dancygier et al. (2015) and include the same standard set of variables capturing the socio-economic and demographic background characteristics. The variables are Gender (1 for female, 0 otherwise), Age (in years), Age squared, Number of children (under the age of 11), Employment status (1 for employed individuals, 0 for all others), Family income (the log of equivalized disposable household income), and Years of education.

Moving to contextual variables, our knowledge of respondents’ residential location allows us to control for the local political opportunity structures respondents face. In particular, we operationalize some of the main concepts highlighted in the literature (Bird, Saalfeld and Wüst, 2011; Dancygier et al., 2015): *Seats-to-voters* is the ratio of municipal council seats to the number of voters, *Effective number of parties*²³ measures the number of parties with seats in the local council, and *Disproportionality*²⁴ measures the difference between party vote and seat shares. We also include the partisan composition. *Left share*²⁵ and *SD share* measure the vote shares received by leftist political parties and the Sweden Democrats, respectively. The latter is the major anti-immigration party in Sweden. To measure the demographic composition of the municipal electorate, we include *Native education* (the average years of education among the native electorate); *Immigrant share* (the share of foreign born in the electorate), and *Ethnic concentration* (the concentration of the immigrant group within the municipality).²⁶

4 Results

4.1 Main Results

For any factor to explain the immigrant–native representation gap two conditions, at a minimum, need to be fulfilled. First, this factor must be correlated with running for office. Second, it must also differ systematically between immigrants and natives.

²³Effective number of parties is defined as $(\sum s_i^2)^{-1}$, where s_i is the seat share of party i .

²⁴We use the Gallagher index, i.e. $G = \sqrt{.5 \sum (v_i - s_i)^2}$, where v_i and s_i indicate votes and seat shares of party i , respectively.

²⁵Leftist parties refer to the Left party, the Social Democratic party, and the Green Party.

²⁶More precisely, concentration is expressed in terms of the Herfindahl index, i.e., $H = \sum d_i^2$, where d_i is the share of the immigrant group coming from region i . Ideally, d_i would denote the share of individuals coming from a specific country, but for reasons of confidentiality we only have access to a variable distinguishing between 27 different regions of birth. For immigrants from countries with a large number of immigrants living in Sweden such as, for instance, Poland, Iran, Iraq, and Turkey the region code is that of the country, but for immigrants from other countries the region code identifies a set of neighbouring countries.

Table 2: What factors are correlated with running for office and do they differ between immigrants and natives?


	Non-candidates	Candidates	Difference
Political interest	0.50	0.76	0.25***
Internal efficacy	0.45	0.80	0.35***
External efficacy	0.44	0.68	0.24***
Discussion networks	0.36	0.57	0.21***
Socialization (one item)	0.32	0.43	0.11***
	Born in Sweden	Immigrants	Difference
Political interest	0.50	0.52	0.02**
Internal efficacy	0.45	0.41	-0.04***
External efficacy	0.44	0.43	-0.01
Discussion networks	0.36	0.37	0.01
Socialization (one item)	0.32	0.34	0.03**
Could consider public office	0.37	0.39	0.02
Nominated 2014 (percent)	0.70	0.33	-0.36***
Elected 2014 (percent)	0.16	0.05	-0.10***

Note: The sample consists of 6386 respondents, of which 3455 (2931) are candidates (non-candidates) and 4106 (2280) are born in Sweden (foreign-born). All cells are based on more than 2000 respondents, except for “Could consider public office.” Because only non-candidates were asked this question, this share is calculated based on 1845 (native) and 1063 (immigrant) respondents. Significance tests are t-tests for differences between means. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Beginning with the first of these conditions, Table 2 shows that candidates and non-candidates differ in predictable ways across the five indices that measure political interest, efficacy, discussion networks and socialization. In substantive terms, candidates score about one standard deviation higher on the indices of political interest ($sd = 0.23$), external efficacy ($sd = 0.25$) and discussion networks ($sd = 0.22$). For internal efficacy, the difference is bigger than one standard deviation ($sd = 0.29$) and for socialization the difference is about one third of the standard deviation ($sd = 0.19$).²⁷ All these factors can therefore be considered as strong predictors for political candidacies.

But do they help us explain why immigrants are less likely to run for elected office than are natives? The bottom panel of Table 2 clearly demonstrates that the group differences in the factors that drive political activity are small and inconsistent. Immigrants are, on average, somewhat more interested in politics, whereas natives score more highly on both

²⁷These differences may be inflated due to feedback loops – campaigning for office may inspire further political interest and efficacy, for example. In the regression analysis below, where the focus is on explaining the representation gap across immigrants and natives, this potential endogeneity is less problematic.



Note: The share of immigrants in the population is 17.1%. The estimated share of immigrants among those willing to run (18.0%) does not differ significantly ($p > 0.10$) from the share of immigrants in the population. Both the estimated share of immigrants among the nominated (9%) and the estimated share among the elected (6.7%) is significantly lower than their share in the population ($p < 0.01$).

Figure 1: The share of migrants at each step to becoming elected

measures of political efficacy. We observe no meaningful group differences when it comes to socialization or discussion networks.

Turning to political ambition, finally, at least as many immigrants as natives appear to have considered running for public office (39 and 37%, respectively). It is possible that these numbers are inflated across both groups, or at least that they do not reflect a serious consideration of a run for elected office among a sizable group of respondents. We therefore also examine a more objective measure – party membership – in Section 4.2 below, and again find few immigrant–native differences.

Summing up, the results in Table 2 do not support the idea that immigrants are underrepresented in public office because they lack the requisite political engagement or motivation. The behavioral measures that we found to be important prerequisites for a career in elected office do not vary significantly across immigrants and natives. In short, it does not appear that immigrants’ political underrepresentation is due to an inadequate supply of motivated and politically engaged potential candidates.

If candidate supply is not the problem, at what stage of the process do immigrants get stuck? Figure 1 presents a first cut at answering this question. It shows the share of immigrants at each step in the process that ultimately leads to election to municipal office. The leftmost bar simply measures the share of immigrants (17.1%) in the eligible population.

Table 3: Regression analyses of who considers, runs for and wins public office


Outcome Sample	Election probability		Stages preceding election		
	Elected Eligible	Willing Eligible	Nominated Willing	Elected Nominated	
<i>Panel A: Bivariate Model</i>					
Immigrant	-0.0010***	0.0254	-0.0110***	-0.0627***	
Constant in bivariate model	0.0016	0.3494	0.0200	0.2243	
Transition ratio	35%	107%	45%	72%	
<i>Panel B: Full model</i>					
Immigrant	-0.0006***	0.0266	-0.0086***	-0.0429**	
<i>Controls/Mediators</i>					
Political interest	0.0029***	0.1660***	0.0356***	0.1081	
Internal efficacy	0.0058***	0.4987***	0.0405***	0.3867***	
External efficacy	0.0045***	0.0249	0.0401***	0.1113**	
Discussion networks	0.0031***	0.2667***	0.0113	0.0984	
Socialization	-0.0021***	0.0572	-0.0105**	-0.0803**	

Note: The number of observations ranges from 6386 (the bivariate model in the leftmost column) to 3319 (the full model in the right-most column). Entries are OLS regression coefficients except for the transition ratio, which is calculated as the coefficient for the immigrant indicator plus the constant (the transition probability for immigrants) divided by the constant (the transition probability for natives).

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

In a system characterized by perfect parity, the distribution of migrants and natives at each subsequent step should mirror that in this first, leftmost bar. However, this is only true of the second step, which shows the share of immigrants among those willing to run (18.0%). Once we move from a willingness to run for office to actually being nominated, we observe a significant drop off, and further declines emerge at the final stage of election. Specifically, among those nominated and elected, immigrants only make up 9 and 6.7%, respectively, suggesting that the major hurdles for immigrants' political representation lie in becoming nominated and, once nominated, in being placed on an electable list position.

These findings once again seem to indicate that the problem does not lie in the pipeline but in the placement of immigrant candidates. To more fully test the supply-side explanation, we move on to multivariate regression analysis. As a benchmark, we first estimate a bivariate model. We next estimate the full model which includes not only the five indices, but also individual-level resources and other socio-demographic characteristics (e.g., education, employment, income, gender) that could potentially impact supply. We further control for municipal political opportunity structures, as these could influence immigrant-native gaps at each stage of the election process (see Section 3.2 for the complete list of variables).



Note: Calculated using results in Table 3. Numbers in boxes are estimated population totals. Numbers above arrows in first two rows are transition probabilities (expressed in %-points). Numbers below arrows in second row are *adjusted* transition probabilities, capturing what transition probabilities would be for immigrants if they were identical to natives with respect to all control variables used in the analysis. Numbers above arrows in last row are immigrant transition probabilities as a percentage of native transition probabilities. Numbers below arrows in last row are *adjusted* transition probabilities for immigrants as a percentage of native transition probabilities. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Figure 2: Transition probabilities for natives and immigrants

If there is an underrepresentation of immigrants at any step, the regression coefficient for the migrant indicator will be negatively signed in the bivariate model. And if any such underrepresentation can be explained with reference to our supply-side factors, the migrant indicator will be indistinguishable from zero once these factors are controlled for.

The results in Table 3 show that the inclusion of controls can only partly account for the representation gap. Beginning with the results in the first column, which are from the model that uses the entire sample to estimate the probability that immigrants and natives become politicians, the coefficient of the constant in the bivariate model (Panel A) shows that an estimated 0.16% of natives become elected politicians. As can be seen from the coefficient associated with the immigrant indicator, the corresponding figure for immigrants is 0.10%-points lower. Immigrants are thus only 35% as likely to be elected to political office as natives – a substantively important difference. This is the number reported in the last row of Panel A (“transition ratio”).

In the full multivariate model (Panel B) the four indices that measure political interest, efficacy and discussion networks have the expected effects on the probability of being elected. Yet the inclusion of these, and of other individual-level and contextual controls, can only partly account for the immigrant–native representation gap; in the full model, the coefficient

for the migrant indicator is smaller, but still both statistically and substantively significant.²⁸

We next turn to models analyzing the steps towards becoming an elected politician, which are in the remaining columns of Table 3 and are also illustrated in Figure 2. 35% of natives are willing to run, whereas the corresponding figure for immigrants is 37.5% ($0.35 + .025$). Taken at face value, the relative willingness to run for office is thus about 7% higher among immigrants compared to natives, as indicated by the number between the two left boxes at the bottom of Figure 2 (107.3%). This difference is, however, small and not statistically significant ($p > 0.10$).

Just as in our previous analyses, the underrepresentation of immigrants does not seem to be due to immigrants being less interested in running for office. Rather, they appear to experience greater difficulties than natives in transitioning from being interested in running to actually getting themselves nominated, and from being nominated to being elected. Whereas 2% of natives go from being willing to run to actually running, the corresponding figure for immigrants is 0.9% ($0.02 - .011$). This difference is not only statistically significant, it is also substantively large: *natives are more than twice as likely to transition to the nomination stage than are immigrants*. Finally, while an estimated 22.4% of nominated natives are elected, the corresponding figure for immigrants is only 16.2%, which is equivalent to a 28% ($100 - 72$) reduction in the likelihood of transitioning to the last stage of winning elected office.

The multivariate regression models analyzing the steps towards elected office further drive home the point that the small and inconsistent immigrant–native differences in the five indices that measure political interest, efficacy, discussion networks and socialization cannot explain immigrant underrepresentation. Even when we take all the control variables into account, the share of immigrants that transition from being willing to run to doing so is still more than 40% lower than that of natives ($100 - 56.9 = 43.1\%$). Likewise, the adjusted proportion of immigrants that transition from the penultimate to the final stage is estimated to be 19.1% ($100 - 80.9$) lower than the share of natives who do so.

To summarize, the results in this section show that previously unmeasured differences in supply-side variables such as political interest, efficacy, discussion networks and ambition do not help explain the representation gap. Neither do individual-level resources, demographics or variables that capture the local political context. Rather, the major hurdles for immigrants lie in translating their political interest and motivation into a nomination for elected office, and, once nomination is secured, in being placed on an electable list position. In the next section, we turn to examining the robustness of our results in the face of several potential objections.

²⁸Full results, including all controls are in Table D.1 of Appendix D. Examining the matter more closely, we find that the reduction in the coefficient for the migrant indicator when moving from the bivariate to the full model is not only due to the inclusion of our indices, but also to the socio-economic and political opportunity structure variables. See Table D.2 in Appendix D in the Appendix for these further analyses.


4.2 Robustness Checks and Extensions

We first examine the potential importance of an intermediate step, becoming a party member. Since Swedish local elections operate by a party-list system, individuals who want to run for office have to first join a party. Indeed, lower levels of party membership have been identified as a factor limiting the supply of immigrant candidates (e.g. da Fonseca, 2011). Our analysis in the previous section could therefore be missing a crucial step: immigrants could simply be less likely than natives to become party members, and this difference could explain their difficulty in transitioning to the nomination stage. Fortunately our survey allows us to examine this question directly. Beginning with attitudes, 38% of immigrants answer that they could consider joining a party compared to 42% of natives. Though this is a statistically significant difference ($p < 0.01$), it is not sizable enough to explain the representation gap. Moreover, when we examine actual party membership, there are no statistically significant ($p > 0.10$) group differences. Among immigrant respondents, 5% report that they are currently party members and 12% that they were ever members. The corresponding figures for natives are 6% and 14%, respectively. Turning to the length of membership, native nominees report having been members for approximately 12 years, whereas the corresponding figure for immigrant nominees is 10 years. This difference is not statistically significant ($p > 0.10$).


Despite there being small immigrant native-differences with respect to party membership, we re-estimated our statistical model in Table 3, this time adding the step of becoming a party member as an additional robustness check. The results can be found in Table D.3 in Appendix D. We also considered the possibility that the order of the stages could differ, namely that party membership precedes the interest in elected office (see Table D.4 in Appendix D).²⁹ When we incorporate party membership in these ways our conclusions remain unchanged: Immigrants are less likely than natives to become nominated and be placed on an electable list position, and this difference cannot be explained with reference to supply-side factors, including party membership.

Second, our analyses thus far have examined the entire sample of eligible residents. But could it be that parties “skim off the top” of the pool and select the most promising candidates? If so, the sample we analyze would not be the relevant one when studying who becomes a representative, and, by implication, when assessing the immigrant–native representation gap. We have already shown that it is mainly individuals with certain characteristics – those of higher socio-economic status, political interest, and efficacy – that effectively make up the candidate pool. Does the immigrant penalty disappear once we restrict our sample to this group? To examine this possibility, we first estimate the predicted probability of being elected and then re-run the model for those scoring in the top x percentiles on election probability. In Figure 3, we plot the coefficient for the migrant indicator, when we let x vary


²⁹According to our survey, 43% of those running for office first joined a party and then decided they wanted to become a politician at a later stage, whereas 12% became party members because they had decided to become a politician (45% are unable to say which came first). To better establish connections with existing literature (e.g., Lawless and Fox, 2010) we chose to present results that consider interest in running as the first step in the main paper.




(a) Elected as share of population



(b) Step I: Willing to run as share of population



(c) Step II: Nominated as share of willing



(d) Step III: Elected as share of nominated

Figure 3: Coefficient for migrant indicator, for each step, when sample is restricted to the top x (10–100) percent of the distribution. Dashed lines represent upper and lower bounds of 95% confidence intervals.

between 10 and 100. Rather than disappearing at the top of the distribution, the migrant penalty is actually the most severe here: as we continuously restrict the sample to ever more qualified potential candidates, the negative relationship between being an immigrant and attaining elected office strengthens. Panel (a) illustrates this pattern when examining the share of the population who gets elected. When we disaggregate the election process as well as the sample in the following panels, we once more find that immigrant–native gaps do not emerge with respect to willingness to run for office, but that they appear at the nomination and election stages. In short, our previous findings are not driven by our broader focus on the entire eligible population. For similar reasons, we have also rerun our analyses with a more restrictive definition of political ambition, where we only count those who answer ‘yes, absolutely’ as willing to run for office. The results, which are presented in Figure D.7 and Table D.8, do not differ much from the main results.

Third, our main analysis does not distinguish between immigrants from different regions of the world. Statistical power considerations prohibit a detailed analysis of ‘origin effects.’ Instead, we break down the immigrant category into those originating from OECD vs. those hailing from non-OECD countries, and do so for several reasons.³⁰ First, as in many European countries, Sweden’s immigrant composition has shifted in recent years with migrants from non-OECD countries gaining in number. This timing may impact political representation, especially if parties increasingly want to recruit voters – and hence candidates – with non-OECD backgrounds. Alternatively, and in line with research on anti-immigrant discrimination in the Swedish labor market (Vernby and Dancygier, Forthcoming), it is possible that our findings about immigrants getting stuck at the nomination and election stages are mainly driven by non-OECD migrants. Finally, it is conceivable that immigrants from non-OECD countries are less likely to consider elected office since the political systems of their home countries, which are often non-democratic, are quite different from the Swedish system. Party elites may therefore face particular supply constraints when it comes to this group. When we reanalyze our results restricting the immigrant sample to respondents born in non-OECD countries (see Appendix D), we find that the results are very similar to our main results. Non-OECD immigrants are less likely than natives to be nominated and placed on an electable list position, and supply-side variables do not close this gap.

Finally, up to now we have conceptualized supply and demand as separate processes. But it is also possible that anticipated demand affects supply to the extent that anticipated failure discourages candidates from coming forward (Norris and Lovenduski, 1993). Underrepresented minorities may expect discrimination from sitting politicians and voters and therefore do not put themselves forward.³¹ To test for this possibility, we included questions measuring respondents’ expectations about societal and political discrimination. According to our survey, immigrants are less likely to expect that they would feel welcome in politics and more likely to believe that migrants are discriminated against in society. For example, immigrants are about twice as likely as natives to expect not to feel welcome as new

³⁰Migrants from non-OECD countries constitute 59% of our sample (43% of the unweighted sample).

³¹See Shah (2014) on expectations of discrimination and minority candidate emergence, Oskooii (2018) on political discrimination and turnout and Hobbs and Lajevardi (2019) on perceived discrimination and public space avoidance more generally.

members of the local parliament (for more details, see Appendix D). Do these expectations influence supply? When we reanalyze our main results (i.e., Table 3) and add controls for both expected societal and political discrimination, we find that incorporating perceived discrimination does not alter our general conclusions. The results show that while these variables mostly have the expected effects, these are substantively small. Most importantly, when we compare the full model in Table D.6 of Appendix D to that in our main results section (see Table 3), it becomes clear that the negative relationship between being an immigrant and attaining elected office is hardly affected at all by the inclusion of perceived discrimination.

5 Conclusions

With the steady growth of immigrant populations across democracies, immigrants’ political representation has attracted increasing attention from scholars and parties alike. Despite this group’s numeric rise, the share of seats held by immigrants often falls below their share in the population. Existing research has frequently blamed discriminatory party elites or native voters for this outcome, but it has paid scant attention to questions related to candidate supply. This is a potentially serious omission. Studies show that a leading cause behind female underrepresentation is the fact that women are less likely than men to believe they are suited for a career in elected office (Lawless and Fox, 2010; Shames, 2017).

To investigate whether similar supply constraints operate among immigrants, we innovate by introducing a new type of survey design to the study of political representation. Our case-control study is unique in that it draws from the entire eligible population to produce a large, nationally representative sample of candidates and non-candidates of both immigrant and native background. It is thus the only study that leverages large-scale individual-level data, and links these data to structural conditions, to assess whether supply-side factors – such as political interest and motivation – drive immigrant underrepresentation.

Using these unique data, we can show that differences in motivation and political engagement cannot explain the immigrant-native representation gap. Immigrants appear to be no less interested in political matters than are natives. And while their sense of political efficacy is slightly lower, they discuss politics as frequently as do natives, are more likely to have grown up in environments in which politics are discussed, and are consequently no less interested in running for office.

Rather than insufficient supply, we find that the major obstacles for immigrants lie in transitioning from (i) being willing to run for office to actually being nominated and (ii) from being nominated to being placed on an electable list position. Moreover, these hurdles remain even when we control for a large number of variables measuring individuals’ resources, motivations, and perceptions, as well as the political opportunity structures in which they are situated.

On the whole, our findings challenge supply-side explanations and provide more convincing support for the idea that it is party gatekeepers who undermine immigrants’ chances to hold elected office. The question that naturally follows is *why* party elites are reluctant

to promote the electoral careers of immigrants. Our findings hold across the ideological partisan spectrum, so it is unlikely that anticipated electoral penalties against immigrant candidates constitute the major driving force. Future research should therefore distinguish between party gatekeepers who willfully leave immigrant candidates off the ballot from those who fail to nominate these candidates because they do not have much contact with immigrant communities and hence are not sufficiently aware of potential immigrant candidates. In many countries, immigrants and natives do not share the same residential space, and this segregation could have an impact on political recruitment.³² In fact, according to our analysis of registry data, the average Swedish adult lives in a neighborhood whose adult population consists of 18.6% immigrants, but for the average elected politician this number drops to 13.5%. Additionally, our survey reveals that many more natives than immigrants know party activists and elected politicians.³³ If lacking intergroup social contacts are an important impediment to immigrant recruitment – and one that is more significant than a feared native backlash – parties who want to increase immigrant representation can invest in organizational structures and outreach efforts. Conversely, if segregation and lacking contacts are symptoms of prejudice and discrimination, these measures would likely fail. That gatekeepers place so many fewer immigrant than native nominees on competitive list positions indicates that lacking knowledge of aspiring immigrant candidates provides a partial answer at best.

Lastly, juxtaposing contact and segregation with presumed electoral penalties could also shed new light on the differing sources of underrepresentation across groups. Women are not residentially segregated from men or from elected politicians and party activists, so it is less plausible to assume that party gatekeepers would not come into contact with qualified potential female candidates. Instead, gendered societal expectations may suppress candidate supply among women (e.g., Kage, Rosenbluth and Tanaka, 2018; Lawless and Fox, 2010). Future work can test whether and how differences in stereotypes and prejudice across groups generate different obstacles on the path towards equal representation.

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³²Moreover, in Sweden segregation into immigrant organizations (vs. membership in general associations) is not conducive to political participation and recruitment (Strömblad and Adman, 2010).

³³58%/51% of natives know a party activist/elected politician compared to 34%/28% of immigrants.

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Appendices

A Data management and variable creation

Index construction

To measure the respondents’ internal efficacy, external efficacy, political interest, network and socialization, we have created five indices (see Table 1 in main text). Before calculating the indices, “Don’t know/No opinion”-answers to the survey items were replaced with the weighted mean of all other survey respondents’ answers on the same question, and missing values were imputed by regressing each indicator on the other indicators in the same index and saving the predicted values. The items were then re-scaled to run between 0 and 1, and, when appropriate, some of them were reverse coded. The indices were then defined as the average value of the included indicators. Consequently, an index value of 0 (1) corresponds to scoring the lowest (highest) possible value on each component item. If more than two items making up the index contained missing values, these were not imputed, and the index value was coded as missing as well.

Table A.1 shows the number of indicators used for each index as well as the Cronbach’s alpha for how strongly correlated the indicators are. The alphas range between 0.8 and 0.94, which we interpret as confirmation that the items that make up each index function as indicators of a common factor.

Table A.1: Reliability of indices

Index	Items	C’s alpha
Internal efficacy	4	0.94
External efficacy	4	0.90
Political interest	6	0.82
Discussion networks	4	0.80
Socialization	1	

Note: Cronbach’s alphas are calculated before imputation.

Weights

The case-control approach means that we are oversampling candidates compared to non-candidates. Because of our specific research purpose, we are also oversampling immigrants compared to natives. To correct for these differences in inclusion probabilities, we re-weight our data using design weights, which are simply the inverse of the sampling probability. This variable adjusts for differences in the sampling probability and response rates between different strata. But to reduce the problems of non-response bias, *Statistics Sweden* has

also calibrated a weighting variable for us, which is constructed such that when it is used, the data resembles the sampling frame with respect to characteristics observable in administrative records. The variables used in the calibration are age and gender categories (5×2), time since migration (born in Sweden, 0–10 years, 11–20 years, >20 years), country of birth (Sweden, OECD or Other), citizenship (Swedish or Other), municipality group (three categories based on size), level of education (three categories), a binary indicator for being employed, income (three categories) and a measure of the seats-to-voter ratio in the municipality (four categories). Unless otherwise stated, analyses in this paper use these calibration weights.

Registry data sources

Our registry data come from the following administrative records: The Swedish Population Register (RTB), the Longitudinal integration database for health insurance and labour market studies (LISA), the Income and Taxation Register (IoT), the Swedish Register of Education (UREG) and the Swedish Register of Employment (SREG). The following variables have been used in the various analyses.

- Sex (RTB).
- Birth year and month (RTB).
- Country of birth for respondent and parents (RTB).
- Number of children (RTB).
- Disposable income (LISA/IoT).
- Wage income (LISA/IoT).
- Level of education (LISA/UREG).
- Labour market status (LISA/SREG).

In addition to these individual-level data, we have also created a set of municipality-level variables. Based on aggregate data publicly available at the homepage of Statistics Sweden, we have calculated the number of effective parties, a measure of disproportionality between vote- and seat shares, the share of left-wing votes, the share of votes on the Sweden Democrats and the seats-to-voters ratio. Three municipal-level variables have been calculated based on individual-level data at our disposal: the share of immigrants in the electorate, the average years of education among natives, and the degree of ethnic concentration measured as an Herfindahl index.

Table B.1: Descriptives with weight comparison

	Design weights			Calibrated weights			Difference
	Swe	Imm	Dif	Swe	Imm	Dif	Dif-in-Dif
Political interest	0.53	0.54	0.01	0.50	0.52	0.02**	0.01
Internal efficacy	0.47	0.44	-0.03***	0.45	0.41	-0.04***	-0.01
External efficacy	0.46	0.43	-0.03**	0.44	0.43	-0.01	0.02
Discussion networks	0.37	0.38	0.01	0.36	0.37	0.01	-0.00
Socialization (one item)	0.32	0.34	0.02**	0.32	0.34	0.03**	0.00
Current party member	0.06	0.06	-0.00	0.06	0.05	-0.01	-0.00
Ever party member	0.15	0.14	-0.01	0.14	0.12	-0.02	-0.01
Could consider to join party	0.41	0.38	-0.03**	0.42	0.38	-0.04***	-0.02
Could consider public office	0.36	0.38	0.02*	0.37	0.39	0.02	-0.00

Note: The comparisons are based on between 6079 and 6339 observations, with two thirds born in Sweden and one third born abroad. For political interest, it is also shown how the results change if we exclude political interest in the EU and in countries outside EU. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

B Data quality

In this appendix we deal with non-response bias, social desirability bias and inter-survey reliability. Beginning with non-response bias, Table B.1 and Table B.2 use two different approaches to analyze whether immigrants are more positively selected than natives among the survey respondents. While positive selection is a general feature of this type of survey, and is something that can be corrected for using weights, the purpose here is to ascertain whether immigrants were *more* positively selected than those born in Sweden.

Beginning with Table B.1, if immigrants were more positively selected than those born in Sweden, the estimates of their political engagement would be biased upwards, also when compared to the Swedish-born population. To reduce the biases caused by non-responders, Statistics Sweden has calibrated weights based on registry data (See Appendix A). These weights are used throughout our analyses. Table B.1 shows what the descriptive statistics would look like if we only used the design weights. As expected, both immigrants and Swedish-born appear more politically engaged when only the design weights are used. This shows that respondents are positively selected on observables used for the weight calibration. However, as shown by the last column, there does not appear to be any difference between those born in Sweden and abroad with regards to how severe this selection bias is.

Another way to assess the selection of respondents is to directly compare them with the target population. While we have some data from administrative records for our respondents, we do not have the same data for our non-respondents or the sampling frame. However, by applying similar sample restrictions as we used when we created the sample frame for the

Table B.2: Comparison between the socio-economic status of respondents and target population

	Target population		Our sample		Sample/Population (%)	
	Nat.	Imm.	Nat.	Imm.	Nat.	Imm.
Years of education	12.9	12.3	12.9	12.8	99.9	103.5
Employment (%)	70.7	57.6	70.8	59.7	100.1	103.8
Disp. income (SEK)	264 845	197 848	259 159	201 937	97.9	102.1
Wage income (SEK)	230 131	166 736	226 674	174 184	98.5	104.5

Note: The target population is an approximation of our actual sampling frame. The data for our sample is weighted using calibration weights.

survey, we can approximate the target population using government registers.³⁴

In Table B.2 we present – first for the approximated target population and then for the (weighted) survey data – four variables: the average length of education, the share of employed, and the mean disposable and wage income. All data come from administrative records. Judging from the rightmost two columns, which show the respondents’ average as a percentage of the average in the target population, it appears as if while migrants are slightly more positively selected than the natives, these differences are small. The fact that they are small, combined with the fact that our main analyses condition on education, income and employment, suggests that these differences will not affect our main results

Next, we use a similar method to assess whether the surveyed immigrants exhibit more social desirability bias than natives. Studies in various countries, including Sweden, have shown that respondents tend to overreport election turnout, in all likelihood due to social desirability bias (Holbrook and Krosnick, 2009). As can be seen in Table B.3, there is a difference in turnout between the target population and the respondents that participated in our study. This, of course, reflects a positive selection of respondents, but it may also reflect social desirability bias. There is, however, no clear pattern with respect to whether the immigrants or natives among our respondents have higher turnout than their target popula-

³⁴The survey was sent out to a sample of those who were eligible to vote (same criteria as for being electable) in the municipal elections 2014, who were 20–74 years old and who also were residing in Sweden when the survey was planned (measured 28 Feb 2017). In our approximated target population, we define eligible as i) being born before September 1996 (the real threshold was 14 September, but we cannot observe exact birth dates), ii) living in Sweden 31 December 2014 (though actual eligibility is based on where you live 30 days before the election) and iii) either being a citizen of Sweden, the EU or the Nordic countries, or having migrated to Sweden no later than 14 September 2011 (residing in Sweden for three years preceding the election). We also exclude those born before September 1939, because they were older than 74 when the survey was sent out. Unfortunately, we lack information about people residing in Sweden during 2017. Instead, we exclude those who were living abroad 31 December 2015. These are obviously not the same people as those who were residing outside Sweden when the survey went out, but we may expect the two groups to share many characteristics. When we calculate the turnout for the 2010 national election, we also exclude those who became citizens after the election (unlike municipal elections, you need to be a citizen in order to vote in the national elections).




Figure B.1: Comparing our survey to the SOM survey: Political interest, government approval and generalized trust




Figure B.2: Comparing our survey to the SOM survey: Ideology and party affiliation

Table B.3: Comparison between self-reported turnout of respondents and actual turnout of target population

	Target population		Our sample		Sample/Population (%)	
	Nat.	Imm.	Nat.	Imm.	Nat.	Imm.
Turnout 2009 (%)	47.7	36.3	76.9	56.8	161.3	156.4
Turnout 2010 (%)	88.8	73.9	96.3	89.6	108.5	121.2

Note: The target population is an approximation of our actual sampling frame. The data for our sample is weighted using calibration weights.

tion. For the 2009 elections to the European parliament the natives among our respondents had a higher turnout in relation to their target population, than did immigrants. Turning to the 2010 parliamentary elections, the opposite pattern obtains.³⁵

Finally, we compare our survey to the SOM survey, which is Sweden’s largest and most well-known public opinion survey, and which has been fielded annually since 1986 (Tipple, 2018). In particular, and in order to be able to gauge inter-survey reliability, we included in our survey a number of identical questions to those in the SOM survey. These comparisons are presented in Table B.4, Figure B.1 and Figure B.2. While the SOM survey relies on a simple random sample, our sample is stratified by immigrant status and nomination. When comparing our sample to the SOM sample, therefore, we apply our design weights. Moreover, the SOM study does not provide any calibration weights. To maximize comparability, we therefore do not apply calibration weights to our data either. We have also restricted the sample in the SOM data to those who are between 20 and 74 years old, which is the age interval used for our survey.

As can be seen from Figure B.1, the distribution of answers for the questions on political interest and interpersonal trust are very closely matched across the surveys; in the case of interpersonal trust even the bi-modal distribution is captured in both surveys. From Table B.4, moreover, it is clear that the small differences fail to reach statistical significance at any conventional level ($p > 0.1$). With regards to government approval, left–right self-placement and party sympathies, there are slight differences across the two surveys. As can be seen in Figure B.2 and in Table B.4, our sample is close to the SOM survey when it comes to party sympathies. The exception is that a smaller share of respondents are Social Democrats in our survey. This tendency is also reflected in the left–right self-placements, which are somewhat more rightward-leaning in our sample, and in government approval (The Social Democrats and The Greens formed a minority government at the time of the survey). While the difference in mean self-placement on the left–right scale across surveys is marginally significant ($p < 0.10$), the substantive difference is small (about one twentieth of the standard

³⁵We also asked our respondents whether they voted in the 2014 election to the Swedish and European parliaments. The reason we were not able to compare these self-reported measures of turnout to those of the target population is that we do not have access to registry data on turnout in those elections, and therefore cannot approximate our survey’s target population.

Table B.4: Descriptives from our survey and from SOM

	Our data	SOM	Difference	St.Dev.
Political interest	2.31	2.30	-0.01	0.77
Left-right scale	3.09	3.03	-0.06*	1.17
Interpersonal trust	6.48	6.40	-0.08	2.30
Government approval	3.11	3.00	-0.11***	1.10
<i>Favourite party</i>				
Left Party	0.07	0.07	-0.00	0.26
Green Party	0.04	0.04	0.00	0.19
Social Democratic Party	0.25	0.33	0.07***	0.44
Centre Party	0.14	0.13	-0.01	0.35
Liberals	0.08	0.06	-0.02***	0.27
Moderate Party	0.15	0.16	0.01	0.35
Christian Democrats	0.03	0.03	-0.00	0.17
Sweden Democrats	0.16	0.14	-0.01	0.36
Feminist Initiative	0.02	0.02	-0.01	0.15
Other Party	0.06	0.04	-0.03***	0.24


The standard deviation presented in the table are calculated using the pooled sample, which consists of both our data and the SOM survey.

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

deviation of the variable). The difference in mean government approval across surveys is somewhat larger ($p < 0.01$), yet still only about a tenth of the standard deviation of the same variable. Some of the differences in ideological orientation and government support are in all likelihood due to differences in the period during which field-work was conducted. Most importantly, the difference in support for the Social Democrats can, in part, be explained with reference to the timing of the two surveys. While our study was fielded between May and September 2017, the SOM study was fielded between September and December 2017. According to the poll aggregator *Poll of Polls*, support for the Social Democrats rose from about 28% to 30% between the first and second survey (<http://pollofpolls.se/>).³⁶

In sum, this section has shown that the responding immigrants in our survey are not more positively selected than natives with respect to education, income and employment. Neither do they exhibit consistently more positive selection and social desirability bias when it comes to self-reported political participation. Moreover, this section has also demonstrated that our survey matches Sweden's largest and most well-known public opinion survey when it comes to political interest and interpersonal trust. There do exist some small discrepancies

³⁶In addition to suggesting an increase in Social Democratic support between the times during which the two surveys were fielded, *Poll of Polls* also suggests that SOM slightly overestimates Social Democratic support, while our survey slightly underestimates it by approximately the same amount.



Note: The graphs show the results from a linear probability model with nomination (left) and election (right) as the dependent variables and immigrant status as the main independent variable. The y-axis measures the percentage point difference between immigrants' and natives' probabilities of becoming nominated and elected, respectively. The individual level controls include gender, number of children aged 0–10, education, family income, employment status, age, and age squared. The municipality level controls include the seats-to-voters ratio, the effective number of parties, the disproportionality between party vote and seat shares, the percentage of votes received by leftist parties, the percentage of votes received by the Sweden Democrats, the percentage of foreign born in the electorate, the average years of education in the electorate, and the ethnic concentration of the immigrant group. All variables are measured in 2014 and the error bars represent 95 percent confidence intervals.

Figure C.1: The native–immigrant gaps in the 2014 Municipal Elections

when it comes to left-right orientation and government approval, but they are, at least partly, explained by changes party sympathies between the time periods during which the two surveys were conducted.

C Registry data analysis of the 2014 election

Like in many other advanced democracies, in Sweden immigrants are underrepresented in politics. Using registry-based micro-data covering the entire Swedish adult population between 1991 and 2010, Dancygier et al. (2015) show that while underrepresentation has steadily declined during the period of study (both in terms of nomination or election), a sizeable gap remains in 2010. Moreover, this gap remains even after controlling for individual-level

variables as well as a set of political opportunity structure variables.³⁷

When we replicate their analysis for 2014, which is the election year under study in this paper, we find that the immigrant–native representation gap and its determinants are very similar to those observed in earlier years. The results are displayed in Figure C.1. The analysis, which is based on government registry data covering 7,400,000 adults, shows the unadjusted and adjusted differences in natives’ and immigrants’ percentage likelihood of being nominated (the leftmost graph) and elected (the rightmost graph) to political office.

The gap between immigrants and natives with respect to becoming elected is about 0.1 percentage points, whereas the corresponding figure when looking at becoming nominated is over 0.3 percentage points. Given that the overall probabilities of nomination and election in the electorate are only 0.7 and 0.2 percentage points, these are sizeable differences. When adjusting for individual level characteristics such as age, gender, income, education, and family- and labor market status these differences decrease by 15–20 percent (see the middle bars). When adding the municipality level controls to the model these gaps decrease even further (the bars to the right), suggesting that local political opportunity structures may be important.³⁸ Yet, about one third of the original gaps remain unaccounted for by the individual level characteristics and the municipality level controls.

D Full results, robustness checks and additional specifications

In this appendix, we provide full results, and test how sensitive they are to various changes in the model specification. In Table D.1, which is an extended version of Table 3, we include not only the coefficient estimates for the indices that measure political engagement, but also those for the socio-economic and opportunity structure variables, as well as those variables that capture the respondents’ favorite parties. We also provide an analysis of how the results for our immigrant indicator changes when we add one set of variables added at a time. This is shown in Table D.2. As can be seen, the coefficient for the immigrant indicator does not change dramatically when any of the sets of control variables are added. From this, it is clear that the reduction of coefficient for the immigrant indicator that we found when going from the bivariate to the full multivariate model cannot be accounted for with reference to a specific set of controls. Rather, the indices measuring political engagement cause the coefficient for the immigrant indicator to drop about as much as do the socio-economic and opportunity structure indicators.

³⁷In 2010, for example, 0.2 percent of the native population was elected to local councils compared to 0.1 percent of the immigrant population.

³⁸Following Dancygier et al. (2015) the municipality level controls include the seats-to-voters ratio, the effective number of parties, the disproportionality between party vote and seat shares, the percentage of votes received by leftist parties, the percentage of foreign born in the electorate, the average years of education in the electorate, and the ethnic concentration of the immigrant group. In addition to this we also control for the percentage of votes received by the Sweden Democrats. These variables are described in section 3.2 of the paper.

Table D.1: Detailed version of main results

Outcome Sample	Election probability		Stages preceding election	
	Elected Eligible	Willing Eligible	Nominated Willing	Elected Nominated
<i>Panel A: Bivariate Model</i>				
Immigrant	-0.0010***	0.0254	-0.0110***	-0.0627***
Constant in bivariate model	0.0016	0.3494	0.0200	0.2243
Transition ratio	35%	107%	45%	72%
<i>Panel B: Full model</i>				
Immigrant	-0.0006***	0.0266	-0.0086***	-0.0429**
<i>Indices</i>				
Political interest	0.0029***	0.1660***	0.0356***	0.1081
Internal efficacy	0.0058***	0.4987***	0.0405***	0.3867***
External efficacy	0.0045***	0.0249	0.0401***	0.1113**
Discussion networks	0.0031***	0.2667***	0.0113	0.0984
Socialization	-0.0021***	0.0572	-0.0105**	-0.0803**
<i>Socioeconomic indicators</i>				
Years of education	-0.0003***	-0.0027	-0.0016***	-0.0071*
Log. income	0.0004***	0.0080	-0.0011	0.0409***
Employed	0.0003	-0.0292	0.0073	0.0235
Female	0.0010***	0.0143	0.0036	0.0533**
Number of children	0.0002*	0.0044	0.0018	0.0166
Age	-0.0000	-0.0022	-0.0010	0.0060
Age squared	0.0000	-0.0000	0.0000**	-0.0000
<i>Opportunity structures</i>				
Effective parties	-0.0001	-0.0049	0.0004	-0.0186
Disproportionality	0.0001	0.0070	-0.0006	0.0181
Left-wing share	-0.0016	0.0662	-0.0386*	-0.0071
SD share	-0.0086**	-0.3225	-0.0721*	-0.2395
Seats-to-voters	0.5891	59.4390	10.8393	-41.0295*
Share of migrants	-0.0029*	-0.1212	-0.0331*	-0.1558
Natives' years of education	-0.0016***	-0.0316	-0.0158***	-0.0570**
Ethnic concentration	0.0016	-0.1893	0.0273	0.0540
<i>Party (Social Democrats used as reference)</i>				
Left Party	-0.0014***	0.0351	-0.0030	-0.0601*
Green Party	0.0002	-0.0198	0.0119*	0.0210
Centre Party	-0.0016***	-0.0941***	-0.0004	-0.0483
Liberals	-0.0015***	-0.0541	-0.0015	-0.1085***
Moderate Party	-0.0004	-0.0424	0.0001	0.0173
Christian Democrats	-0.0008	0.1059	0.0160*	-0.0630*
Sweden Democrats	-0.0010**	0.0322	-0.0064	0.0643
Feminist Initiative	-0.0024***	0.0482	-0.0100	-0.1641***
Other	0.0003	-0.0242	0.0064	-0.0115

Entries are OLS regression coefficients except for the transition ratio, which is calculated as the coefficient for the immigrant indicator plus the constant (the transition probability for immigrants) divided by the constant (the transition probability for natives). All regression coefficients are shown in the table except for the constant and the coefficients for the party dummies. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table D.2: Main results with one set of variables added at a time

Outcome Sample	Election probability		Stages preceding election		
	Elected Eligible	Willing Eligible	Nominated Willing	Elected Nominated	
<i>Panel A: Bivariate Model</i>					
Immigrant	-0.0010***	0.0254	-0.0110***	-0.0627***	
Constant in bivariate model	0.0016	0.3494	0.0200	0.2243	
Transition ratio	35%	107%	45%	72%	
<i>Panel B: Coefficient of migrant indicator when controlling for...</i>					
... Indices	-0.0008***	0.0384*	-0.0101***	-0.0504***	
... Socioeconomic indicators	-0.0008***	0.0173	-0.0088***	-0.0622***	
... Opportunity structures	-0.0008***	0.0201	-0.0098***	-0.0563***	
... Favourite party	-0.0011***	0.0353	-0.0113***	-0.0625***	
<i>Panel C: Full model</i>					
Immigrant	-0.0006***	0.0266	-0.0086***	-0.0429**	

Entries are OLS regression coefficients except for the transition ratio, which is calculated as the coefficient for the immigrant indicator plus the constant (the transition probability for immigrants) divided by the constant (the transition probability for natives). All regression coefficients are shown in the table except for the constant and the coefficients for the party dummies. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Next, we proceed by showing what our results would look like if we presented them with an additional step on the road to becoming elected: becoming a party member (Figures D.1–D.3 and Tables D.3–D.4). In Sweden, the political parties are much more important than the individual candidates, and in practice one cannot run for office without being member of a political party. Moreover, people often join a party for other reasons than to become a politician. Among the candidates who answered our survey, it was three times more common that they joined a party before considering to run for office, compared to joining a party because they wanted to run. It can therefore be argued that becoming a party member is a necessary step that precedes the nomination process as well as – for most people – the decision to run for office. On the other hand, the share of respondents who state that they could consider to run office is much larger than the proportion of party members. We therefore present analyses both with the first step being the willingness to run for office (Figure D.1, Figure D.2 and Table D.3) as well as being a party member (Figure D.3 and Table D.4). As discussed in the section on robustness checks and extensions in the main paper, these analyses, which include the step of becoming a party member, do not alter our main conclusion. Immigrants are less likely than natives to become nominated and be placed on an electable list position, and this difference cannot be explained with reference to differences in party membership.




Figure D.1: The share of migrants at each step to becoming elected




Figure D.2: Transition probabilities including party membership as an additional step. Based on Table D.3

Table D.3: Regressions including party-membership as an additional step

Outcome Sample	Election probability		Stages preceding election		
	Elected Eligible	Willing Eligible	Partymember Willing	Nominated Partymembers	Elected Nominated
<i>Panel A: Bivariate Model</i>					
Immigrant	-0.0010***	0.0254	-0.0316	-0.0542***	-0.0627***
Constant in bivariate model	0.0016	0.3494	0.1636	0.1237	0.2243
Transition ratio	35%	107%	81%	56%	72%
<i>Panel B: Full model</i>					
Immigrant	-0.0006***	0.0266	-0.0142	-0.1274***	-0.0429**
<i>Controls/Mediators</i>					
Political interest	0.0029***	0.1660***	0.0428	0.0453	0.1081
Internal efficacy	0.0058***	0.4987***	0.0940	0.3339***	0.3867***
External efficacy	0.0045***	0.0249	0.0017	0.2853***	0.1113**
Discussion networks	0.0031***	0.2667***	0.2286***	-0.0907	0.0984
Socialization	-0.0021***	0.0572	-0.0153	-0.0211	-0.0803**

Entries are OLS regression coefficients except for the transition ratio, which is calculated as the coefficient for the immigrant indicator plus the constant (the transition probability for immigrants) divided by the constant (the transition probability for natives). * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$




Figure D.3: Transition probabilities including party membership as a step before willingness to run. Based on Table D.4

We then continue by reanalyzing our main results, this time excluding immigrants born in another OECD-country. The results, which are shown in Figure D.4 and Table D.5, are similar to our main results. In particular, non-OECD immigrants are less likely than natives to be nominated and placed on an electable list position, and supply-side variables do not close this gap.

In Figure D.5 and Table D.6 we add controls for whether the respondent would expect to feel welcome as a new member of the local parliament and to what degree the respondent believes immigrants are discriminated against in society. The first is measured by a survey item that asks “Imagine that you are a newly elected member of the municipal assembly. Would you expect to feel welcome?” The respondents could then answer on a 4-point response scale and immigrants were about twice as likely to not expect to feel welcome ($p < 0.01$). Perceptions of societal and political discrimination was measured by an index consisting of 4 survey items that ask respondents to indicate whether they think (i) employers prefer employees that are born in Sweden, (ii) it is harder for immigrants to make a political career in Sweden, (iii) immigrants are underrepresented because of the negative attitudes of native Swedes and (iv) voters are less likely to vote for immigrants. The items were re-scaled to run between 0 and 1. From these we created an index of perceived discrimination that is the average of these four items. Immigrants score somewhat higher (mean=0.62) on this perceived discrimination index than do natives (mean=0.60). The difference is statistically significant at $p < 0.01$.

As can be seen, the effects of perceived societal and expected political discrimination are as expected, but substantively small. When we compare the model in Table D.6 to that in our main results section (see Table 3), it is clear that the negative relationship between immigrant status and attaining elected office is hardly affected at all by the inclusion of expected societal and political discrimination

We also analyze a model that is identical to the main model in all respects, except that we

Table D.4: Regressions including party-membership as a step before willingness to run

Outcome Sample	Election probability		Stages preceding election		
	Elected Eligible	Partymember Eligible	Willing Partymembers	Nominated Willing	Elected Nominated
<i>Panel A: Bivariate Model</i>					
Immigrant	-0.0010***	-0.0077	0.1687**	-0.1095***	-0.0627***
Constant in bivariate model	0.0016	0.0574	0.6290	0.1967	0.2243
Transition ratio	35%	87%	127%	44%	72%
<i>Panel B: Full model</i>					
Immigrant	-0.0006***	-0.0028	0.0611	-0.1487***	-0.0429**
<i>Controls/Mediators</i>					
Political interest	0.0029***	0.0458	0.1888	0.0289	0.1081
Internal efficacy	0.0058***	0.0928***	0.9150***	0.3062***	0.3867***
External efficacy	0.0045***	-0.0049	0.2706*	0.3534***	0.1113**
Discussion networks	0.0031***	0.1339***	-0.0557	-0.1157	0.0984
Socialization	-0.0021***	0.0108	0.0316	-0.0250	-0.0803**

Entries are OLS regression coefficients except for the transition ratio, which is calculated as the coefficient for the immigrant indicator plus the constant (the transition probability for immigrants) divided by the constant (the transition probability for natives). * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

control for whether natives have one or more foreign-born parents. The coefficient estimates for the immigrant dummy are hardly affected at all by the inclusion of this control, as can be seen in D.6 and Table D.7. This shows that the simplified approach of treating natives as one group, irrespective of their parents' countries of birth, that is used in the main paper does not affect our conclusions.

In the main paper, we define the criteria for political ambition as answering either 'yes, absolutely' or 'yes, maybe' on the question whether the respondent could consider running for office. According to this definition, approximately 35 percent of the population is willing to run for office. This number is probably an exaggeration. Figure D.7 and Table D.8 therefore presents what our results would look like if we only categorized those answering 'yes, absolutely' as willing to run. This shows that using the more inclusive definition of willing in the main paper does not alter our main conclusions.




Figure D.4: Transition probabilities excluding OECD-immigrants. Based on Table D.5

Table D.5: Regressions excluding OECD-immigrants

Outcome Sample	Election probability		Stages preceding election		
	Elected Eligible	Willing Eligible	Nominated Willing	Elected Nominated	
<i>Panel A: Bivariate Model</i>					
Immigrant	-0.0011***	0.0342	-0.0117***	-0.0734***	
Constant in bivariate model	0.0016	0.3494	0.0200	0.2243	
Transition ratio	31%	110%	42%	67%	
<i>Panel B: Full model</i>					
Immigrant	-0.0002	0.0337	-0.0041	-0.0445*	
<i>Controls/Mediators</i>					
Political interest	0.0031***	0.1483**	0.0389***	0.1079	
Internal efficacy	0.0062***	0.4961***	0.0443***	0.3996***	
External efficacy	0.0049***	0.0397	0.0435***	0.1184**	
Discussion networks	0.0032***	0.2758***	0.0101	0.0952	
Socialization	-0.0023***	0.0732*	-0.0114**	-0.0825**	

Entries are OLS regression coefficients except for the transition ratio, which is calculated as the coefficient for the immigrant indicator plus the constant (the transition probability for immigrants) divided by the constant (the transition probability for natives). * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$




Figure D.5: Controlling for expected societal and political discrimination. Based on Table D.6

Table D.6: Controlling for expected societal and political discrimination

Outcome Sample	Election probability		Stages preceding election		
	Elected Eligible	Willing Eligible	Nominated Willing	Elected Nominated	
<i>Panel A: Bivariate Model</i>					
Immigrant	-0.0010***	0.0254	-0.0110***	-0.0627***	
Constant in bivariate model	0.0016	0.3494	0.0200	0.2243	
Transition ratio	35%	107%	45%	72%	
<i>Panel B: Full model</i>					
Immigrant	-0.0006***	0.0293	-0.0083***	-0.0387**	
<i>Controls/Mediators</i>					
Political interest	0.0029***	0.1630***	0.0351***	0.1145	
Internal efficacy	0.0057***	0.4956***	0.0398***	0.3810***	
External efficacy	0.0044***	0.0150	0.0382***	0.1211**	
Discussion networks	0.0031***	0.2709***	0.0122	0.0957	
Socialization	-0.0020***	0.0604	-0.0101**	-0.0805**	
<i>Expectations of discrimination</i>					
Welcome in parliament	0.0001	0.0228	0.0035*	-0.0185	
Perceived discrimination	-0.0021***	0.0324	-0.0174**	-0.0714	

Entries are OLS regression coefficients except for the transition ratio, which is calculated as the coefficient for the immigrant indicator plus the constant (the transition probability for immigrants) divided by the constant (the transition probability for natives). * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$




Figure D.6: Accounting for ‘second generation’ immigrants. Based on Table D.7

Table D.7: Accounting for ‘second generation’ immigrants

Outcome Sample	Election probability		Stages preceding election		
	Elected Eligible	Willing Eligible	Nominated Willing	Elected Nominated	
<i>Panel A: Bivariate model</i>					
Immigrant	-0.0011***	0.0335	-0.0122***	-0.0628***	
Second generation	-0.0004**	0.0591**	-0.0074***	-0.0009	
<i>Panel B: Full model</i>					
Immigrant	-0.0007***	0.0304	-0.0086***	-0.0429**	
Second generation	-0.0002	0.0223	0.0001	-0.0001	
<i>Controls/Mediators</i>					
Political interest	0.0029***	0.1641***	0.0356***	0.1082	
Internal efficacy	0.0058***	0.4988***	0.0405***	0.3867***	
External efficacy	0.0045***	0.0258	0.0401***	0.1113**	
Discussion networks	0.0031***	0.2668***	0.0113	0.0984	
Socialization	-0.0021***	0.0571	-0.0105**	-0.0803**	

Entries are OLS regression coefficients except for the transition ratio, which is calculated as the coefficient for the immigrant indicator plus the constant (the transition probability for immigrants) divided by the constant (the transition probability for natives). * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$




Figure D.7: Restrictive definition of willing

Table D.8: Restrictive definition of willing

Outcome Sample	Election probability	Stages preceding election		
	Elected Eligible	Willing Eligible	Nominated Willing	Elected Nominated
<i>Panel A: Bivariate Model</i>				
Immigrant	-0.0010***	-0.0042	-0.0309***	-0.0627***
Constant in bivariate model	0.0016	0.1128	0.0620	0.2243
Transition ratio	35%	96%	50%	72%
<i>Panel B: Full model</i>				
Immigrant	-0.0006***	-0.0073	-0.0464***	-0.0429**
<i>Controls/Mediators</i>				
Political interest	0.0029***	0.0596	0.1150***	0.1081
Internal efficacy	0.0058***	0.2332***	0.1108***	0.3867***
External efficacy	0.0045***	-0.0080	0.1192***	0.1113**
Discussion networks	0.0031***	0.1893***	-0.0302	0.0984
Socialization	-0.0021***	0.0507	-0.0400*	-0.0803**

Entries are OLS regression coefficients except for the transition ratio, which is calculated as the coefficient for the immigrant indicator plus the constant (the transition probability for immigrants) divided by the constant (the transition probability for natives). * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$